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The Triage and Treatment of
Healthcare Institutions in Distress:
How to Involve State Regulators in
Healthcare Bankruptcies and
Receiverships
Honorable Brian P. Stern and Christopher J. Fragomeni*†
INTRODUCTION

As hospitals and other healthcare institutions continue to face
a changing landscape in methods of patient care, reimbursement
models, and employment practices, some of these institutions will
continue to become subject to court supervised insolvency
proceedings, including federal bankruptcy and state court
receiverships.1 Financially distressed healthcare institutions pose
* Brian P. Stern, Associate Justice, R.I. Superior Court; Director,
American College of Business Law Judges; J.D., Brooklyn Law School. Judge
Stern’s experience prior to his superior court appointment includes: Chief of
Staff to Governor Donald L. Carcieri; Executive Director, R.I. Department of
Administration; and Deputy Chief of Legal Services and Chief Securities
Examiner, R.I. Department of Business Regulation. Christopher J.
Fragomeni, Associate, Shechtman, Halperin, Savage, LLP; J.D., cum laude,
Roger Williams University School of Law.
† Judge Stern currently presides over Kent County’s Out-County
Business Calendar, where he oversaw the receivership of Westerly Hospital.
The authors are grateful to the bankruptcy judges, state court judges,
bankruptcy and healthcare practitioners, and state regulators for their input.
This large undertaking would not have been possible without their support
and counsel.
1. See Gus Kallergis & Jean R. Robertson, The § 363 Miracle Drug?, 28
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 14 (2009); Deryck A. Palmer & Michele J. Meises,
Collision Course Between Bankruptcy and Health Care Laws: Which Will
Ultimately Control?, 1999 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 1, 1 (1999); Veronique A.
Urban & Ted A. Berkowitz, Peninsula Hospital: Dissecting a Health Care
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unique and complex public policy concerns when the goals of an
insolvency proceeding conflict with a state’s responsibility to
regulate the public health through state regulatory agencies.2 In
particular, the purpose of an insolvency proceeding, which is to
maximize a monetary recovery for creditors, may conflict with a
state regulatory agency’s responsibility to ensure adequate and
necessary healthcare under its certificate of need and licensing
statutes.3 In such instances, due to a regulatory agency’s
statutory and inherent power, the exercise of its regulatory
authority may affect the value of the bankruptcy estate and
ultimately the amount and timing of funds distributed to
creditors.4
This Article explores the goals of bankruptcy,
receivership, and state regulation, and considers how courts have
reconciled the interests of a healthcare debtor, its creditors, and
state regulatory authorities. This Article submits that in the
purview of healthcare insolvency, the early and continuous
involvement of regulators throughout the insolvency proceeding
will streamline the administration of the debtor’s estate in a way
that advances the state regulator’s interests to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens while maximizing recovery for
the creditors. It further suggests several ways that regulatory
involvement can be achieved, either formally or informally.
Part I of this Article briefly provides an overview of the
process and goals of federal bankruptcy, state receivership
proceedings, and state regulation of healthcare institutions. Part
II identifies the material conflict between the goals of insolvency
and governmental healthcare regulation. Part III explains the
importance and power of state regulatory agencies and highlights
how a regulatory authority can substantially affect an insolvency
proceeding.
Part IV discusses several recent healthcare
Business Bankruptcy, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 42, 42 (2013); Ayla Ellison, 10
Recent Hospital Bankruptcies, Closures, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/10-recent-hospital-bankruptci
es-closures-january25.html.
2. See In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-1159, 1997 WL 176574,
at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 1997) (noting that healthcare institutions should be
treated differently in insolvency proceedings).
3. “State agency” refers to any agency that can affect the transfer or
sale of a healthcare institution including: (1) a state’s department of health in
transferring licenses and certificates of need or (2) a state’s attorney general
in transferring or disposing of a non-profit hospital’s charitable assets.
4. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
114-244); In re United Healthcare, 1997 WL 176574, at *10.
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institutions’ insolvencies and highlights the involvement, or lack
of involvement, of state regulatory agencies and how such action
or inaction affected the insolvency proceeding. Last, Part V will
make several recommendations on how state regulators can be
involved in bankruptcy and receivership proceedings so that a
healthcare institution may successfully navigate through
insolvency.
I.

INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS, STATE REGULATION, AND THEIR GOALS

In order to evaluate the coarse interplay between insolvency
and state regulation, it is important to understand the bankruptcy
and receivership process as well as the manner in which states
regulate healthcare facilities.
Further, it is important to
understand the goals and purposes of insolvency proceedings and
state regulation and how they conflict.
A. Bankruptcy
1.

Bankruptcy Process

If a healthcare institution or its creditors seek to initiate a
bankruptcy proceeding, they may do so by filing a voluntary or
involuntary petition5 under Chapter 7, 9, or 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.6 Under a Chapter 7 proceeding, a bankruptcy court takes
control of a debtor’s assets, liquidates them, and distributes the
proceeds from the sale of the assets to the debtor’s creditors in a
manner consistent with the Code.7 In return for this liquidation,
the debtor receives a discharge of certain debts.8 However, if the
healthcare institution is owned or controlled by a “municipality,”9
5. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–303(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–
244).
6. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)–(d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244);
ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1.07(2), at
1–31 (16th ed. 2016) (“Chapter 9 is available only to a municipality and only
by means of a voluntary petition.”); Ellen E. Sward, Resolving Conflicts
Between Bankruptcy Law and the State Police Power, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 403,
405 (1987).
7. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 701–784 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244);
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(1)(a), at 1–25.
8. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 523–524, 727(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
114–244).
9. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(40) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244);
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(2), at 1–31 (defining “municipality”
broadly as “political subdivisions or public agency or instrumentality of a
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it may seek relief under Chapter 9 of the Code, provided that it
has specific authorization from the state.10 Under Chapter 9, the
municipality negotiates a plan with its creditors, bondholders, and
note holders that enables the municipality to adjust its debt and
continue operations.11 If a healthcare institution petitions for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Code, its debt is reorganized
in a manner in which the debtor can pay the sum of its creditors’
approved claims with its future earnings.12 Reorganization is a
“negotiating process, and Chapter [11] provides the milieu for
such negotiation . . . . It [] provides . . . a balancing [] tool [] and
leverage among the parties involved in the process to foster
negotiation and bargaining.”13
The most important effect of a bankruptcy filing—either
under Chapter 7, 9, or 11—is the imposition of an automatic stay
on any collection actions or claims against the debtor.14 The
automatic stay serves as,
one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell
from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all
harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the
debtor to attempt to [formulate a liquidation plan,]
reorganization plan, [plan of adjustment,] or simply to be
relieved of the financial pressures that drove [it] into
bankruptcy.15
state,” including “cities, towns, and counties”).
10. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244);
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(2), at 1–31 (Chapter 9 is the only
type of bankruptcy available to a municipality.). Such limitation is premised
upon the separation of federal and state government:
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution limits the power of
Congress to prescribe for the state or any portion of a state and
Chapter 9 reflects this limitation. For example, should a city file a
Chapter 9 petition, the bankruptcy judge may not take over the
governance of the city, appoint a trustee or otherwise interfere with
the affairs of the city.
Id.
11. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(2), at 1–31.
12. Id.; see Sward, supra note 6, at 405.
13. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(3), at 1–31.
14. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
Importantly, as discussed infra, Part III, the automatic stay does not apply to
state regulatory actions.
15. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, pt. 1, at 340 (1977).
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The purpose of the automatic stay is to prevent a creditor
remedying its claims against the debtor to the detriment of other
creditors.16 Without the automatic stay, creditors would be in a
“race to the courthouse” to ensure a collection of their debts.17
Rather, the automatic stay provides a bankruptcy court and
creditors the opportunity for an orderly liquidation and an
equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets according to the
priority of the creditors’ claims and rights under the Code.18
Specifically, the automatic stay prevents a debtor’s creditors from
commencing or continuing a lawsuit; enforcing a judgment;
controlling any property of the bankruptcy estate; creating,
perfecting, or enforcing a lien; collecting debts; or exercising any
rights of setoff against the debtor.19 While broad in its scope, the
automatic stay has several exceptions, one of which, as discussed
infra, specifically exempts state regulatory actions against the
debtor.
2.

Bankruptcy Goals

While the goals of the Code vary and are far reaching, the two
main fundamental purposes of bankruptcy are (1) “either to
rehabilitate financially a distressed debtor or to assemble and
liquidate his assets for distribution to creditors,”20 and (2) “to give
the [debtor] a fresh start.”21 In achieving either goal, “the nature
of bankruptcy is to sort out all of the debtor’s legal relationships
with others, and to apply the principles and rules of the
16. See HON. NANCY C. DREHER & HON. JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY
LAW MANUAL § 2:1, at 2 (5th ed. 2008).
17. See In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981). “The automatic stay . . . is designed ‘to prevent a chaotic and
uncontrolled scramble for the debtor’s [assets] in a variety of uncoordinated
proceedings in different courts.’” Id. (quoting Fid. Mortg. Inv’rs v. Camelia
Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976)). “Such procedural safeguard
‘shields creditors from one another by replacing ‘race’ and other preferential
systems of debt collection with a more equitable and orderly distribution of
assets.’” Id.
18. DREHER & FEENEY, supra note 16, § 2:1, at 2.
19. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(1–7) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–
244).
20. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, pt. 1, at 10 (1977); see In re Saint Vincents
Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 429 B.R. 139, 146 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“One
of the Bankruptcy Code’s main purposes . . . ‘is to convert the bankrupt’s
estate . . . and distribute it among creditors.’”).
21. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913); see also RESNICK &
SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.01(1), at 1–4.
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bankruptcy laws to those relationships.”22
The first fundamental goal of bankruptcy—to either
reorganize debts or liquidate assets for the benefit of creditors—is
advantageous because it “‘secure[s] a prompt and effectual
administration and settlement of the estate of all bankrupts
within a limited period.’”23 However, in a Chapter 7 liquidation of
assets, the distribution of the proceeds may not be done in an
equal way; a creditor’s priorities determine the amount of their
claim they will recover and whether they will receive that money
before or after other creditors.24 This hierarchical structure
“protects the rights of senior creditors against dilution either by
junior creditors or equity interests.”25
Furthermore, the second goal of bankruptcy—to give a debtor
a fresh start—“gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt.”26 Thus, “[t]he essence of [bankruptcy] is to provide a
mechanism for the reorganization of a financially distressed
business . . . in the hope that a profitable and productive member
of its economic community can one again emerge.”27
B. Receivership
1.

Receivership Proceedings

While there are many different types of receivership
proceedings,28 this Article will focus on state receivership in the
22. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, pt. 1, at 10 (1977).
23. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.01(1) at 1–4 (quoting Katchen
v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at § 1.01(1) at 1–5 (quoting Marine Harbor Props. v. Mfrs. Tr. Co.,
317 U.S. 78, 87 (1942)).
26. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citation omitted).
This goal can be accomplished through Chapter 7 discharge of debts or a
restructure of debts under Chapter 11 into a practicable and feasible future
repayment plan. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.01(1), at 1–4. It can
further be achieved by the Code’s allowance of debtors to withdraw assets
from the bankruptcy estate up to a certain value. See 11 U.S.C.A. §
522(b)(1)–(2), (d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
27. RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 6, § 1.07(3)(a), at 1–31 (alteration in
original).
28. See 65 AM. JUR. 2D Receivers §§ 2, 3 (2011); see also WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, § 7708, at
168–69 (perm. ed., rev. 2015).
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purview of insolvency. Due to its equitable nature, receivership
serves as a practical, flexible, and more adaptable alternative to
bankruptcy.29 As an equitable remedy, receivership proceedings
can “be tailored to the circumstances of the case to a much finer
degree than a bankruptcy.”30 For instance, in receivership, a
court has the ability to set out procedures, rules, or any other
mechanisms that are appropriate to the specific insolvency.31
Parties to a receivership proceeding may benefit from it because,
assets are sold or disposed of more quickly, and the
secured lender’s collateral is more quickly adjudicated, []
notification of creditors is simplified, [] the lender has
greater control over the disposition of assets and
management of the case since the lender compensates the
receiver, [] distributions to secured creditors generally
proceed faster since subordinate classes of creditors
typically receive no distribution, [] the lender is shielded
from liability to third parties for negligence from
possession, and [] the time required to eject a borrower is
shortened under a receivership versus a foreclosure
action.32
Generally, the grounds for appointment of a receiver are
designated by statute,33 and one of those grounds is typically the
dissolution or liquidation of a distressed business.34 As mentioned
above, a receiver may also be appointed in equity.35 In addition,
similar to a bankruptcy petition, a receivership proceeding may be
initiated voluntarily (by the debtor) or involuntarily (by the
29. John M. Tanner, Equitable Receivership as an Alternative to
Bankruptcy, 40 COLO. LAW 41, 46 (2011). “An equitable receivership may
provide better relief for investors in or creditors of a troubled company than a
bankruptcy reorganization. Receiverships immediately replace management,
are more flexible, and can be more closely tailored to the situation.” Id. at 41.
“Generally speaking, receivership proceedings are less formalistic and less
structured than federal bankruptcy proceedings.” Allan M. Shine,
Receiverships Survive Pre- Emption Attack, 47 R.I. B.J., Mar. 1999, at 11.
30. Tanner, supra note 29, at 41.
31. See id.
32. Shine, supra note 29, at 11 (citation omitted).
33. See FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 7709, at 171; see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 291 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.010 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6401 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1316 (2016).
34. See Receivers, supra note 28, § 36.
35. Tanner, supra note 29, at 41.

154 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:147
creditors).36 If a petition for receivership is approved, the court
then appoints a receiver, who takes control of the debtor’s
assets.37 By definition, a receiver is “an officer of the court to
receive, collect, care for, administer, and dispose of the property or
the fruits of the property of another or others brought under the
orders of court by the institution of a proper action or actions.”38
More simply, a receiver is an indifferent, disinterested officer of
the court, who is subject to the court’s direction and orders, and
who possesses and controls property for the court while ensuring
redress and repayment of creditors’ claims against the debtor.39
As a receivership proceeding sounds in equity, a court has
broad powers to prevent interference in administrating the estate
by issuing a stay order, similar to the automatic stay in
bankruptcy proceedings.40 A stay is typically issued in the order
appointing a receiver and freezes the assets of the debtor,
preventing the sale, attachment, garnishment, or levy of any lien
against any property in the receivership estate.41 The purpose of
a receivership stay is similar to the bankruptcy stay: “a receiver
must be given a chance to do the important job of marshaling and
untangling a company’s assets without being forced into court by
every investor or claimant.”42 However, a court, in its discretion,
may grant a creditor relief from the stay in order for the creditor
to exercise its rights over property in the receivership estate.43
2.

Receivership Goals
Originally, receivership served as an equitable remedy for

36. See Receivers, supra note 28, §§ 11, 12.
37. See FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 7665, at 15–16.
38. RALPH E. CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS
§ 11, at 13 (3d ed. 1992) (citation omitted). While there are many types of
receivers, this Article will focus on the court-appointed receiver. See id. § 11,
at 13–15.
39. See id. § 35(a), at 37.
40. See Receivers, supra note 28, §§ 120, 400.
41. See CLARK, supra note 38, § 47, at 50; Receivers, supra note 28, § 124.
A violation of the stay will void the conveyance and is grounds for contempt of
court. Id. §§ 125, 129.
42. United States v. Acorn Tech. Fund, L.P., 429 F.3d 438, 443 (3d Cir.
2005).
43. See id. (“Nevertheless, an appropriate escape valve, which allows
potential litigants to petition the court for permission to sue, is necessary so
that litigants are not denied a day in court during a lengthy stay.”); see also
Receivers, supra note 28, § 125.
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creditors.44 The fundamental purpose of any receivership action
is to bring property under the control of the court so that it may be
held pending litigation and possibly disposed of in order to satisfy
judgments.45 Concerning a liquidating receivership, however,
there is generally one goal: “the maximizing of the value of the
assets for the benefit of the creditors,”46 which can be done either
through the sale of the entity as a going concern, or a liquidation
of the company’s assets.
C. State Regulation of Healthcare Entities
1.

State Power to Regulate

All states bear the ability to exert “police powers” over their
citizens, which have broadly been defined as the “power of
governing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal
Government . . . .”47 The United States Supreme Court has
explained that “[b]ecause the police power is controlled by 50
different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of
governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally
administered by smaller governments closer to the governed.”48
Such traditional police power is properly exerted by a state when
it regulates its citizens’ health, safety, and general welfare.49
Additionally, “[a] state’s police power with regard to
protection of the health, morals, and welfare of the public
includes, by implication, the right to regulate by requiring a
license as a prerequisite to the carrying on of certain activities,
commonly designated as businesses, occupations, professions,
vocations, trades, or callings.”50 Most relevant and specific to the
44. Diane Finkle, Attorney Practice Guide: Creditors’ and Debtors’ Rights,
56 R.I. B.J. Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 9, 10 (citing CLARK, supra note 38, § 4, at 4);
see FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 7812.50, at 16.
45. See CLARK, supra note 38, § 47, at 51; see also Receivers, supra note
28, § 181. “The court holds and administers the estate through receivership
as its officer for the benefit of those whom the court will ultimately adjudge to
be entitled to it.” FLETCHER, supra note 28, § 7810, at 448 (citation omitted).
46. Fleet Nat’l Bank v. H & D Entm’t, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 226, 244 (D.
Mass.), aff’d, 96 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 1996).
47. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012)
(citation omitted).
48. Id.
49. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 300 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
50. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and Permits § 9 (2011) (citing Great Atl. &
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topic of this Article, “[i]t is elementary that the promotion and
protection of the public health is a proper subject for exercise of
the police power of the State and, obviously, [healthcare
institutions], whether publicly or privately owned, are operated
for that purpose and subject to State regulation.”51 Generally,
there are three instances in which states regulate a healthcare
institution: (1) at its inception; (2) during its operation; and (3)
during the transfer of its licenses, certificate of need, ownership,
or the healthcare facility’s closure.52
At a healthcare institution’s inception, the majority of states
require that healthcare institutions satisfy the state’s certificateof-need statute before providing any healthcare service within the
state.53 A certificate of need “requires a facility to obtain the

Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937)).
51. Foster v. N. Carolina Med. Care Comm’n, 195 S.E.2d 517, 528 (N.C.
1973) (alteration in original).
52. See 41 C.J.S. Hospitals §§ 6, 9 (Westlaw 2016).
53. Currently, almost every state requires a healthcare institution to
obtain a certificate of need before operating. See ALA. CODE § 22-21-266
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 18.07.031 (2016);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 127245 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-638 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9304 (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016)
(effective Dec. 31, 2020); D.C. Code § 44-406 (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
408.041 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-6-40
(2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 323D-49 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sec.
Spec. Sess.); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3960/5 (West, Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.63 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.061 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2116 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Extr. Sess.);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 329 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 197.315 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); M ONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-5-301 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 71-5829.03 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 439A.100 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 151:5-a (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-7 (West, Westlaw through
2016 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2802 (McKinney, Westlaw through
2016 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-178 (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3702.52 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
1-851.3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
442.315 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 448.603 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 23 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-15-4 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-160 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. §
68-11-1607 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9434 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. §
32.1-102.3 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.38.115 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2D-8 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
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state’s approval prior to purchasing major medical equipment,
changing institutional health services, or making a capital
expenditure.”54 By its inherent nature, an application for a
certificate of need will only be granted if there is a genuine need
for the proposed healthcare facility.55 While they vary from state
to state, typically, the determination of a certificate of need is
decided by statutory factors.56 If statutory factors are not
applicable, the regulating agency will review “the number of
persons in each region who will need [the] services, and the
resources needed to provide those services, which are then
compared to existing resources to determine whether additional
services are needed.”57
During a healthcare institution’s operation, it is subject to
state regulation over its day-to-day operations.58 For instance,
there are sanitary, labor, and insurance regulations imposed by
states to assure that healthcare institutions are operating in
accordance with business practices deemed a necessity by the
state and to guarantee adequate healthcare treatment.59
Healthcare institutions, specifically hospitals, are subject to
licensing requirements in addition to certificate of need
requirements.60
Once a healthcare’s certificate of need is
approved, it must also make application for a license to operate a
54. Palmer & Meises, supra note 1, at 5.
55. 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 10 (Westlaw 2016).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Desai v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 662, 667–68 (N.J.
1986).
59. See id. This Article will not address this instance of regulation during
an insolvency proceeding by states, as it has already been addressed by the
Code. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 333 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244). If a
healthcare institution enters bankruptcy, a 2005 amendment to the Code
permits a bankruptcy court to order the appointment of a patient care
ombudsman “to monitor the quality of patient care and to represent the
interests of the patients of the health care business.” Id. Based on this
amendment, it is likely that receivership proceedings would also appoint such
an ombudsman to assure adequate patient treatment. Accordingly, the law
in this instance of state regulation seems to be well settled, and this Article
will only focus on state regulation during the subsequent sale of healthcare
institutions that have entered insolvency proceedings.
60. 40A AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums § 5 (2008) (“The operation of
an institution for the shelter, feeding, and care of sick, aged, or infirm
persons bears a reasonable relation to the health, safety, and welfare of the
community, and is thus subject to licensing and regulation by the state as a
valid exercise of the police power.”).
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healthcare institution.61

If a license is approved, it may be

61. Id. All states, except Ohio and the District of Columbia have
licensing requirements for hospitals. See ALA. CODE § 22-21-22 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 47.32.020 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-430 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-213 (West, Westlaw through
2016 Sec. Extr. Sess.); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70103 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Register); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3-101 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19A-491 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Spec. Sess.) (effective Oct. 1, 2015 to Sept. 30, 2016); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 1003 (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016); D.C. CODE ANN. §
44-502 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 395.003 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-3 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-14.5 (West, Westlaw through
2016 Sec. Spec. Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 39-1303 (West, Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess.); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/4 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); IND. CODE § 16-21-2-10 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 135B.3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-427 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 216B.105 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. §
40:2103 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1811
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19318 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 51
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.21511
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 144.50 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-9-7 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.040 (West, Westlaw through
2016 Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-5-201 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-432 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.030 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.)
(effective June 30, 2016); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-2.2 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 amendments); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-5 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805 (McKinney, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-77 (West, Westlaw through
2016 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-01 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-702 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.) (effective through Sept. 1, 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 441.015 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 448.806 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-4 (2016); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-7-260 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12-2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sess. Laws); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-11-204 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.021 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-21-8 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Third Spec.
Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1903 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Spec.
Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-125 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.41.090 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.)
(effective June 28, 2016); W. VA. CODE § 16-5B-2 (West, Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. § 50.35 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-2-902 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Budget Sess.).
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revoked for certain causes enumerated by statute, typically having
to do with gross negligence or abusive or reckless conduct.62
In the event that a healthcare institution changes ownership,
generally, neither a certificate of need nor a license can be
transferred or assigned.63 Therefore, a healthcare institution’s
most valuable asset—its licenses to operate—cannot be “acquired”
as part of a transfer in ownership.64 Instead, a change in
ownership will require the application for a new set of licenses and
certificate of need.65 Thus, a purchasing organization must obtain
a license and certificate of need through a purchaser’s application
for licensure.66 Further, in addition to application for approval of
a certificate of need and other licenses, many states require that
the purchaser also seek approval from the state under “conversion
laws,” which regulate the conversion of hospitals.67
2.

Goals of State Regulation

While state regulation of a healthcare facility has numerous
purposes and goals, there are several goals specific to certificates
of need and other licensing demands. The primary purpose of
certificate of need statutes “is to ensure that the citizens of the
state will receive necessary and adequate institutional health
services in an economical manner.”68 “Included among the
62. Hospitals and Asylums, supra note 60, §5.
63. Palmer & Meises, supra note 1, at 5; see, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT.
85/4 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-29-2-7
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.11 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-A
(McKinney, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3702.523 (West, Westlaw through through File 124 of the 131st General
Assembly 2015–2016); 3 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-5-19 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6811-1620 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-902
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Budget Sess.).
64. Palmer & Meises, supra note 1, at 5.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Samuel R. Maizel & Mary D. Lane, The Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals
Through Bankruptcy: What BAPCPA Wrought, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 74
(2011); see e.g., 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-5 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
19a-486c (West, Westlaw through 2016 Spec. Sess.) (effective Oct. 1, 2015 to
Sept. 30, 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-20,104 (West, Westlaw through
2016 Reg. Sess.).
68. Hospitals and Asylums, supra note 60, § 6; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 9
(Westlaw 2016).
The essence of American certificate-of-need legislation, in general . . .
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legitimate purposes for a certificate of need statute is ensuring
geographically convenient access to healthcare for state
residents . . . .”69 Certificates of need accomplish this purposes by:
(1) regulating capital expenditures of the healthcare institution;
(2) preventing unnecessary expansion and encouraging
“appropriate allocation of resources for healthcare purposes”; and
(3) reducing healthcare cost through the prevention of
“unnecessary duplication of health resources.”70
State licensing requirements also serve several state
regulatory goals. The inherent requirement in a state’s ability to
require licenses is that such licensing requirements must relate to
the health, moral, or general welfare of the state’s citizens.71
Accordingly, any purpose of a license requirement must advance
those goals. For instance, a state may establish certain standards
that must be satisfied as a prerequisite to engaging in the
regulated activity, thereby being able to ensure the competency
and fitness of the licensee.72 By vetting a licensee’s training,
knowledge, and experience, and holding them to certain
standards, the state protects the public from being subject to
unreasonable risk from unqualified individuals engaging in the
licensed activity.73 Such license protections allow for uniformity
within the regulated field and ensure that the licensed services
are being provided in an adequate manner.
II. THE INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE GOALS OF STATE
[is] to provide the statutory ability to refuse permission to build beds
or provide services, without providing any counter-balancing
authority to initiate action to either build more beds when they are
needed or develop alternative patterns of care that would make more
beds unnecessary.
Gerard R. Goulet, Certificate of Need Over Hospitals in Rhode Island, 15
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 127, 130 (2010).
69. Hospitals, supra note 68, § 9.
70. Hospitals and Asylums, supra note 60, § 6; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 9
(Westlaw 2016).
71. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
If the license requirement is rationally related to the health, safety, morals,
or general welfare of society, it is a proper exercise of the state’s police
function. Id. at 489. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he day is gone
when [a] Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought.” Id. at 488.
72. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and Permits §§ 51, 52 (2011).
73. See id. § 82.
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REGULATION AND INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS

In examining the purposes and goals of bankruptcy,
receivership, and state regulation, an inherent conflict between
the purposes of insolvency proceedings and state regulatory goals
is evident when a healthcare institution is a debtor.74 In fact, this
conflict was the primary focus of In re United Healthcare Systems,
Inc.75 when a federal district court recognized that the case
“present[ed] the very complex and difficult interrelation between
public healthcare and bankruptcy.”76
United Healthcare Systems, Inc. (United) was a New Jersey
hospital that offered healthcare services to children and adults.77
In the beginning of 1997, United, who was experiencing serious
financial trouble, notified the Commissioner of Health and Senior
Services of New Jersey of its economic plight, which was
attributable to the fact that its primary lender refused to advance
it any further funds.78 Recognizing the importance of United’s
services to the citizens of New Jersey, the Commissioner provided
United with $3 million to keep pediatric care operating.79
Further, because United’s doctors and nurses were being solicited
by other hospitals, the Commissioner issued a moratorium against
the hiring of United’s medical staff.80
Over the next month, United worked with the Commissioner
to draft a request for proposal (RFP) for the sale of United’s
74. In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-1159, 1997 WL 176574, at
*5 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 1997).
75. Id.; see also Maizel & Lane, supra note 67, at 12.
76. In re United Healthcare, 1997 WL 176574, at *1. The United
Healthcare Court was the first to address the interrelation between public
healthcare and insolvency; in fact, it noted that it was a matter of first
impression at the time. Id at *5.
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id.
79. Id. The Commissioner stated:
[T]he services currently provided at United are extremely critical
and cannot be discontinued without disrupting a crucial source of
care for the community. United, for example, currently has over 150
patients, including numerous neonatal and pediatric patients in
neonatal intensive care, pediatric intensive care, neonatal
intermediate care, and patients in a general care pediatric floor. I
therefore conclude that an emergency situation exits necessitating
the use of the expedited review process.
Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *1. The moratorium was in effect until February 14, 1997. Id.
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assets.81 Four bidders responded to the RFP: Saint Barnabas
Corporation (Saint Barnabas), University of Medicine and
Dentistry of New Jersey/Cathedral Healthcare Systems, Inc.
(University of Medicine and Dentistry), Primary Health Care
(Primary Health), and Medical Management of America (Medical
Management).82 After reviewing the submissions, United’s Board
of Trustees “awarded the sale of United to Saint Barnabas.”83 The
next day, Saint Barnabas and United negotiated and finalized a
definite agreement that memorized the sale.84 Pursuant to the
agreement, United was to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy so that
Saint Barnabas would not have to assume United’s liabilities.85
Additionally, the agreement required United and Saint Barnabas
to apply for and obtain requisite certificates of needs and
licenses.86 Due to the emergent nature of United’s financial crisis,
the Commissioner granted the certificate of needs and authorized
United to close its hospital and Saint Barnabas to operate a
pediatric acute care facility.87
Pursuant to the agreement, United filed bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 of the Code the next day.88 At the same time, United
filed an “Application for an Order Authorizing the Sale of Certain
of Debtor’s Assets” (Sale Application) under § 363 of the Code.89
However, University of Medicine and Dentistry filed an objection
to the Sale Application and tendered an offer for United’s assets.90
The bankruptcy court held that “it was the clear intention of the
parties that . . . in the § 363 bankruptcy process the Court would
have the opportunity to take higher and better offers, subject to
the Commissioner’s approval required in the certificate of need
process.”91 Further, the bankruptcy court determined that “the
Board’s decision to award the sale to Saint Barnabas was not a
sound business judgment” as it “defeated the ability of the

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *2.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *2–3.
88. Id. at *3.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-21785, at *9
(Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 5, 1997).
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Bankruptcy Court to carry out its function to obtain a fair price for
the debtor’s assets for the benefit of the creditors of th[e] estate.”92
Consequently, because the sale to Saint Barnabas was not as
beneficial to creditors as the sale to University of Medicine and
Dentistry, the bankruptcy court voided the sale.93
United
appealed to the district court, arguing that the bankruptcy court
abused its discretion in voiding the sale to Saint Barnabas.94
The district court, in its review of the bankruptcy court’s
decision, recognized that “[t]he issue of the interrelation of [a]
[s]tate’s healthcare concerns and the bankruptcy court’s monetary
goals” are hard to reconcile.95 Noting that healthcare institutions
pose unique and complex policy considerations, the district court
held that they are “[u]nlike the sale of corporations in the private
sector,” because a healthcare institution’s petition for insolvency
“involves the rights and obligations of the State to govern public
health.”96
For instance, “[t]he most valuable asset of the
[healthcare institution], i.e., its goodwill, is inextricably
intertwined with the requisite [certificate of needs] and licenses
which can only be granted by the [state].”97 Accordingly, the
district court held that a court must “look to the overriding
consideration of public health represented by the virtual
orchestration of the . . . sale process” of a healthcare institution.98
With that policy consideration in mind, the district court held that
a court “cannot mechanically apply [insolvency] principles of
‘highest and best’ offer” in the sale of a healthcare institution.99
The district court explained that instead, a court “must not only
weigh the financial aspects of the transaction but also look to the
countervailing consideration of a public health emergency.”100
The district court further explained that courts should engage in a
92. Id. (quoting In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-21785, at *17
(Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 5, 1997).
93. Id. The bankruptcy court found that University of Medicine and
Dentistry’s offer “saved more jobs; gave better protection to physician
contracts and was for more money when the waiver of [University of
Medicine and Dentistry] over $1 million claim is factored in the equation.”
Id. at *6.
94. Id. at *3.
95. Id. at *5.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *5.

164 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:147
“totality of the circumstances” approach and not “overwhelmingly
focus[] on the monetary aspects of [] competing bids.”101 Because
the bankruptcy court simply made a monetary analysis, without
consideration to the state’s need to regulate healthcare
institutions, the district court reversed the decision of the
bankruptcy court and remanded the matter for further
consideration.102
In re United Healthcare illustrates the inherent conflict that
exists when state regulation of healthcare institutions collides
with the goals and purposes of insolvency proceedings.103 This
dichotomy is seen in the differing approaches employed by the
bankruptcy court and district court: while the bankruptcy court
conducted a pure monetary analysis, finding “highest and best”
offer to be appropriate because it resulted the maximum recovery
for creditors, the district court recognized that the case presented
a unique situation in which the “highest and best” offer may not
yield the best result without taking public health concerns into
account.104 In In re United Healthcare, it is apparent that the
district court gave effect to the Commissioner’s actions and the
state’s need for pediatric services in Newark, New Jersey, which
served to trump University of Medicine and Dentistry’s “highest
and best” offer.105
The conflict between achieving a maximum recovery for
creditors and ensuring compliance with healthcare regulation can
be illustrated in more specific instances. For example, a state
regulatory agency may believe that the hospital should be closed
completely because either the need for such services has decreased
or the hospital cannot afford to stay open.106 However, creditors
101. Id. at *5, 6.
102. Id. at *5, 10.
103. See id. at *1–10.
104. Id. at *5.
105. See id. at *7. The district court found that “the [bankruptcy] [c]ourt
is without the technical and expert knowledge to second guess the
Commissioner on public health and safety issues.” Id. at *8. Further, it
pronounced that “[c]ourts are not experts in public health and safety issues
and this Court bows to the knowledge of the Commissioner in those areas. If
the Commissioner felt that there was a public need for the Children’s
Hospital to be operated as a unit . . . , federal courts should accept it as such.”
Id.; see also Palmer & Meises, supra note 1, at 13–14.
106. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs., 429 B.R. 139, 143
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), discussed infra. The hospital in In re Saint Vincents
arguably closed because “the State Department of Health said there [was] no
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may believe that a return on the hospitals assets can be
maximized if it is sold as a going concern entity.107 Additionally,
an acquirer of a hospital may make assumptions that it will be
able to renegotiate Medicaid or commercial insurance contracts in
order to receive higher reimbursement rates; yet, a state regulator
charged with Medicaid regulation may reject such proposed
modifications because a reimbursement rate may be statutorily
capped.108 Or, a sale of a not-for-profit hospital to a for-profit
entity, which may yield a higher return to the creditors, may be
objected to by the state because such sale would result in a
decrease in charitable healthcare. Further, the selling hospital
may need an expedited review of the acquiring entity’s transfer
licenses so that a sale may be finalized; however, state regulators
may need to conduct their due diligence to ensure the purchaser is
qualified to provide healthcare to the state’s citizens, regardless of
how long that process may take.109
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE REGULATORS

A regulator can be a debtor’s most “valuable ally” or “worst
nightmare” because of the substantial impact they can have on an
insolvency proceeding.110 Regulators derive their powers from (1)
explicit powers in the Code and federal law and (2) their inherent
powers outside the Code, such as their ability to grant or deny
certificates of need or licenses, make capital infusions, or waive
administrative fees.111

need for an acute care hospital in Greenwich Village.” Kevin Clarke, The
Last Days of St. Vincent’s, AMERICA, July 5, 2010, at 18.
107. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs., 429 B.R. at 143,
discussed infra.
108. Gaube v. Landmark Med. Ctr., No. 08-4371, at 3–5 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Jan. 7, 2015) (order denying plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce); see also Richard
Salit, Landmark denied pass on Medicaid minimums, PROVIDENCE J., Jan.
12, 2015, at A1, A6.
109. See Application for Expedited Consideration of First Day Matters at
1, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10,
2010), discussed infra.
110. Stuart Phillips & Hal F. Morris, The Care and Feeding of State
Regulators in Chapter 11 Cases, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8 (2003).
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw through
Pub. L. No. 114–244); 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 362(b)(4), 503(b) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 114–244).

166 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:147
A. The Code and Other Federal Laws
Under the Code, a regulator’s importance and power stems
from their ability to ensure that the debtor, bankruptcy trustee, or
receiver is operating its business in a lawful manner during the
insolvency proceedings.112 Such ability is less restrictive than
other creditors or parties in the insolvency proceeding because
federal law requires that the debtor comply with all state laws
during the time of the insolvency.113 On a federal level, this grant
of power and authority to state regulatory agencies is found in the
Code, the U.S. Code, and the U.S. Constitution.114
The U.S. Code requires that all trustees, receivers, and
debtors in possession comply with state regulations and laws
during the insolvency proceeding. Specifically,
a trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause
pending in any court of the United States, including a
debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the
property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or
manager according to the requirements of the valid laws
of the State in which such property is situated, in the
same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would
be bound to do if in possession thereof.115
Courts have interpreted this section of the U.S. Code to mean
that the trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession must comply
with state laws and regulation as if no insolvency proceeding were
in place.116
112. Phillips & Morris, supra note 110, at 8.
113. See id.; 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw). Any state action, proceeding
or judgment against a debtor in order to enforce the state’s regulatory power
is exempt from the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(4) (Westlaw).
“The legislative history for this police power exception is sparse, but it
indicates that the police power exception was not intended to be given an
expanded interpretation. Rather, Congress intended only to safeguard the
states’ ability to protect the health and safety of their citizens.” Sward, supra
note 6, at 421–22.
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw); 11
U.S.C.A. §§ 362(b)(4), 503(b) (Westlaw); see also Phillips & Morris, supra note
110, at 8.
115. 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw).
116. Phillips & Morris, supra note 110, at 8; see also SEC v. Wealth
Mgmt., LLC, 628 F.3d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Just as an owner or
possessor of property is required to comply with state law, so too must a
receiver comply with state law in the ‘management and operation’ of the
receivership property in his possession.”).
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Specific to bankruptcy, certain exceptions have been carved
out of the Code for regulators. First, in certain instances,
regulators may claim an exception to the automatic stay.117 While
the automatic stay affords a debtor relief inasmuch as it halts or
prevents any claims against the debtor, an exception exists to the
automatic stay for a state to exercise its “police powers.”118 “This
so-called ‘police power exception’ specifically empowers regulators
to continue to exercise their police and regulatory power against
the debtor (including, incidentally, fixing the amount of fines or
penalties owed to the government).”119 Second, in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the Code provides that regulatory fees and fines
imposed post-petition for bankruptcy are to be treated as
administrative expenses, and thus entitled to priority in
distributing the estate.120 Further empowering a state regulator
in a bankruptcy proceeding is the fact that the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution protects any state (or its
regulatory agencies) from being a part of a federal law suit;
therefore, a debtor in bankruptcy may only have limited
circumstances in which it is seek remedies against the
regulator.121
As seen above, the Code, the U.S. Code, and the U.S.
Constitution provide a state regulator with the ability and power
to drastically change and affect the outcome of an insolvency
proceeding by assuring the debtor’s lawful compliance with state
laws, or increasing fees, costs, and administrative expenses
charged to the estate.
B. Inherent Powers Outside the Code
Regulators further derive their power from their inherent
117. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(4) (Westlaw).
118. See id.
119. Phillips & Morris, supra note 110, at 8; see also In re Saint Vincents
Catholic Med. Ctrs., 429 B.R. 139, 148 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Courts have
narrowly construed 362(b)(4) to allow actions by governmental units to
continue if they are enforcing laws affecting health, welfare and public safety
and not to merely protect its pecuniary interest.”).
120. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (Westlaw).
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); Phillips & Morris, supra note
110, at 8.
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ability to approve, deny, or otherwise modify any license or
certificate of need necessary to operate a healthcare institution or
to affect a healthcare institution’s finances by making capital
infusions, waiving licensing fees, or issuing loans secured by
bonds.
1.

Licenses and Certificates of Need

Perhaps the most obvious and inherent power of a regulator is
its ability to approve licenses and certificates of need because such
approval is a requisite to operation of a healthcare institution.122
If an entity wishes to operate a hospital, it must first receive
approval from the state’s department of health.123 Therefore, the
department of health’s decision as to whether to grant a license or
certificate of need is a gateway to operating a hospital; the
existence or non-existence of a hospital is dependent upon the
department of health’s decision and finding that such hospital is
needed. Such ultimate determination gives the department of
health the power over the operation or closure of healthcare
institutions. For example, Peninsula Hospital was a New-Yorkbased not-for-profit teaching hospital with resident-training
programs in “orthopedics, general surgery and family practice.”124
Peninsula Hospital faced serious financial trouble and submitted
a plan of closure to the New York Department of Health (NY
DOH).125
However, that plan of closure was subsequently
withdrawn126 and, on August 16, 2011, an involuntary Chapter 11
petition was filed against Peninsula Hospital.127 Thereafter, NY
DOH informed Peninsula Hospital that it was “extremely
concerned about the current ability of Peninsula to admit new
patients in a manner that maintain[ed] patient safety and me[t]
minimum standards required by the State Hospital Code.”128 As a
122. See Hospitals and Asylums, supra note 60, § 5.
123. See id.
124. Urban & Berkowitz, supra note 1, at 1.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Involuntary Chapter 11 Petition, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr.,
11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011), ECF No. 1. Peninsula Hospital
ultimately consented to an order for relief. See Consent To The Entry Of An
Order For Relief, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 2011), ECF No. 20.
128. Urban & Berkowitz, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Letter from Richard
M. Cook, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Health Systems Management, to
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result, NY DOH prohibited Peninsula Hospital from admitting
any new patients.129
Five months later, Wadsworth Center, a public health
laboratory that was run by NY DOH, conducted an inspection at
Peninsula Hospital that resulted in the issuance of two summary
orders: (1) an order summarily suspending Peninsula Hospital’s
clinical laboratory permit for thirty days; and (2) an order
determining that the continued operation of Peninsula Hospital
without the services of its clinical laboratory poses a danger to the
health of current and future patents and required that Peninsula
Hospital divert ambulances, cease admitting new patients,
immediately develop a plan to relocate current patients, cancel all
surgeries and procedures, and suspend all general activity
dependent on laboratory services.130
One day after the issuance of the NY DOH’s orders, the U.S.
Trustee filed a motion seeking the appointment of a Chapter 11
Trustee, arguing that there was gross mismanagement of
Peninsula Hospital and that the appointment of a trustee was in
the best interests of Peninsula Hospital’s creditors.131 Upon
consent of the parties, a Chapter 11 Trustee was appointed.132
Following operational and financial due diligence, the Chapter 11
Trustee submitted a plan of closure for Peninsula Hospital, which
was approved by NY DOH—the hospital promptly closed and
thereafter on April 9, 2012, its emergency department and
services no dependent on a clinical laboratory ceased.133 It has
been observed that NY DOH’s decision to close Peninsula
Hospital’s clinical laboratory “sealed the hospital’s fate,” and lead
Robert Levine, President and CEO, Peninsula Hospital Center (Aug. 19,
2011) (on file with N.Y. Department of Health)).
129. Id.
130. See Motion to Appoint Trustee Pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 1104(a)(1) and
(2) at Exs. C and D, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 24, 2012), ECF Nos. 438-4, 438-5.
131. See Motion to Appoint Trustee Pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 1104(a)(1) and
(2) at 19-20, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb.
24, 2012), ECF No. 438.
132. Consent Order Directing the United States Trustee to Appoint a
Chapter 11 Trustee, In re Peninsula Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012), ECF No. 463.
133. See Status Report of Chapter 11 Trustee at 1–2, In re Peninsula
Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 510; see
also Second Status Report of Chapter 11 Trustee at 2, In re Peninsula
Hospital Ctr., 11-47056 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 542.
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to its ultimate closure.134
2.

Capital Infusions

After the grant of the requisite licenses, or during the
insolvency proceeding, state regulators can also affect a
healthcare institution’s financial status by making capital
infusions, waiving fees, and issuing loans. As seen in In re United
Healthcare supra and discussed infra in Part IV, state regulatory
agencies have assisted distressed hospitals by giving them
operating capital to prevent bankruptcy and allow time for a
transfer of ownership.135 The capital allows the hospital to
continue operation and ensures the state regulator that the public
need is being met while also allowing time for the hospital to seek
sponsors, partners, or potential purchasers to help satisfy its
obligations to its creditors.136 Such capital contribution literally
can “buy time” for an insolvent hospital to assess its financial
options and determine a plan of action, making regulators a
valuable ally in tough economic times. Capital infusions by state
regulators typically take the form of “debtor in possession” (DIP)
financing from the state.137 For instance, Interfaith Medical
Centers, a not-for-profit hospital in New York, successfully
navigated through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy because the NY DOH
134. Rich Brockman, Peninsula Trustee Alleges Fraud Lead to Closure,
TIMES LEDGER (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.timesledger.com/stories/
2013/38/peninsulalawsuit_tl_2013_09_20_q.html; see also N.Y. STATE DEP’T
OF HEALTH, REPORT ON THE CLOSING OF PENINSULA HOSPITAL (2012),
https://www.health.ny.gov/events/public_hearing_reports/peninsula_hospital/
docs/2012-07-10_public_hearing_closure_rpt.pdf.
135. See In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 1-12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec.
2, 2012); In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 10-11963 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010); In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., 1997 WL 176574
(L. Civ. R. Mar. 26, 1997).
136. See, e.g., Debtor’s Motion for Interim and Final Orders: (I)
Authorizing the Debtor to Utilize Cash Collateral of Prepetition Secured
Party; (II) Granting a Superpriority Claim; (III) Granting Adequate
Protection; (IV) Providing Related Relief; and (V) Scheduling a Final Hearing
at 3, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 1-12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2,
2012), ECF No. 7 [hereinafter Debtor’s Motion for Interim and Final Orders].
137. See id. at 1–9 (noting that many DIP loans treat the state as a bank);
Pei Shan Hoe, Hospital troubles leave taxpayers on hook to pay back state
loans, THE NEW YORK WORLD (May 22, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.
com/2012/05/22/hospital-troubles-leave-taxpayers-on-hook-to-pay-back-stateloans. DIP loans by the state are typically backed by bonds, and the bonds
are guaranteed by the state. Id. Therefore, if the hospitals fail to pay the
bonds, the state must pay the investors. Id.
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and Dormitory Authority of New York (DANY) gave it a capital
infusion to filibuster its closure.138 After Interfaith Hospital
(Interfaith) entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, NY DOH was
dissatisfied with the management of Interfaith and in a letter to
Interfaith’s Board of Directors explained that it would only fund
Interfaith if Interfaith submitted a business restructuring plan
that would enable Interfaith to operate outside of Chapter 11
without future funding by NY DOH.139 Interfaith submitted its
restructuring plan, but NY DOH rejected the plan as not “fiscally
viable”; therefore, NY DOH ordered Interfaith to submit a plan of
closure.140 NY DOH indicated that if the plan of closure were
submitted, DIP financing would be available but such availability
was conditioned on closure of Interfaith.141 Because no other
funding was available, and a transfer of ownership looked
unfeasible, Interfaith submitted a motion to the bankruptcy court
for approval to close.142 With Interfaith’s only option besides
closing being receiving funding from the state, the bankruptcy
court continued Interfaith’s motion to close, and referred the
closure to mediation with the hope that an agreement could be
made between NY DOH and Interfaith.143 Despite hesitation by
NY DOH, the matter emerged from mediation with an agreement
between Interfaith, NY DOH, and DANY, in which DANY’s DIP

138. See Debtor’s Motion for Interim and Final Orders, supra note 136, at
2–5.
139. Declaration of John D. Leech in Support of Debtor’s Motion for Entry
of an Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Authorizing the Debtor to Implement, in Accordance with New York State
Law, a Plan of Closure for the Debtor’s Hospital and Certain Affiliated
Outpatient Clinics and Practices at Exhibit A, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc.,
12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2013), ECF No. 673 [hereinafter
Declaration of John D. Leech].
140. Id. at Exs. B, C.
141. Id. at Ex. C.
142. Notice Of Hearing On Debtor’s Motion For Entry Of An Order
Pursuant To Sections 105, 363 And 1108 of The Bankruptcy Code,
Authorizing the Debtor to Implement, In Accordance With New York State
Law, a Plan of Closure For the Debtor’s Hospital and Certain Affiliated
Outpatient Clinics and Practices at Ex. A, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 1248226 (July 30, 2013), ECF No. 602 [hereinafter Interfaith’s Motion to Close];
Nina Bernstein, Interfaith Med. Ctr. Plans to Close, N.Y. TIMES (July 31,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/nyregion/interfaith-medical-center
-plans-to-close.html?_r=0.
143. See Order Assigning Matter to Mediation, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013), EFC No. 797.
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loan would be modified so that Interfaith may receive a capital
infusion in the amount of $7.5 million for it to continue operations,
$3.5 million of which was to be from NY DOH.144 Because of this
capital infusion, Interfaith was able to avoid closure, continue
operations, and successfully adopt a plan of reorganization.145
3.

Administrative Fees

State regulators can financially assist a distressed hospital by
waiving or deferring payment of administrative fees, such as
licensing fees. As reimbursement models have changed, licensing
fees have steadily increased from year to year.146 As the costs of
licensing fees enter the millions147, a state regulator’s ability to
enforce, defer, or otherwise waive the fee gives that regulator the
ability to drastically affect a hospital’s financial status. For
example, in Kinney v. Westerly Hospital Healthcare, Inc.,
addressed infra, prior to its insolvency, Westerly Hospital was
paying $3.5 million in licensing fees.148 During its receivership
proceeding, the Rhode Island Division of Taxation (who is charged
144. See Stipulation and Order Modifying Final DIP Order, In re
Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014), ECF No.
864; Paul DeBenedetto, Interfaith to Stay Open Until March as Judge
Approves
$25
Million,
BEDFORD-STUYVESANT
(Jan.
28,
2014),
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20140128/bed-stuy/interfaith-stay-openuntil-march-as-judge-approves-25-million.
145. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Confirming Second
Amended Plan of Reorganization for Interfaith Medical Center, Inc., In re
Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc., 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2014), ECF
No. 1158. The Reorganization plan calls for NY DOH to assume control of
Interfaith Hospital and replace senior management in return for additional
state funding. Id.
146. See S. FISCAL OFFICE, ISSUE BRIEF: MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE
SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENTS at 3 (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/
sfiscal/Other%20Documents/Medicaid%20Disproportionate%20Share%20Hos
pital%20(DSH)%20Program.pdf; see also R.I. DEP’T OF REVENUE DIV. OF TAX’N,
NOTICE: HOSPITAL LICENSING FEE INCREASE FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING ON OR
AFTER JANUARY 1, 2013 (July 2015), http://www.tax.ri.gov/Tax%20Website/
TAX/notice/Notice%202015-07%20—%20Hospital%20licensing%20fee%20
change.pdf; CAL. DEP’T. OF PUB. HEALTH, HEALTH FACILITY LICENSE FEES
ANNUAL REPORT FY 2012–2013 at 6 (2012), available at https://www.
cdph.ca.gov/pubsforms/fiscalrep/Documents/LicCertAnnualReport2012.pdf.
147. See ISSUE BRIEF: MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL
PAYMENTS, supra note 146; NOTICE: HOSPITAL LICENSING FEE INCREASE FOR
FISCAL YEAR ENDING ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2013, supra note 146.
148. S. FISCAL OFFICE, ISSUE BRIEF: HOSPITALS IN R.I. FISCAL OVERVIEW at
13 (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/sfiscal/ Other%20Documents/
Hospitals%20Financial%20Overview.pdf.
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with the enforcement of hospital licensing fees) brought a claim
for payment of Westerly Hospital’s licensing fee in the amount of
$4,420,600.149 Pursuant to the Rhode Island Department of
Health’s authority to issue and revoke operating licenses, it
threatened to revoke Westerly Hospital’s operating license if the
fee was not paid.150
A review of the above reveals that a regulator’s power is
founded in many areas, is extensive, and can have a drastic
impact on an insolvency proceeding. Accordingly, it is evident
that state regulators deserve “special attention” in healthcare
insolvency proceedings.151
IV. CASE STUDIES

The dichotomy between bankruptcy, receivership, and state
regulatory goals, as addressed in In re United Healthcare, exploits
the inherent conflict between a state’s regulatory police power and
the goals of insolvency proceedings. While such conflict is farreaching in application,152 this section of this Article will focus on
the conflict between the goals of insolvency proceedings and state
regulation in the purview of healthcare institutions. Specifically,
this Article and the following section will analyze cases in which a
healthcare institution has entered an insolvency proceeding—
either bankruptcy or receivership—and how the conflict between
the goals of state regulation and insolvency are achieved by the
early and active participation of state regulators. This section will
address two cases: In re Saint Vincent’s Catholic Medical Centers
of New York and In re Saint Michael’s Medical Centers, Inc. The
matter of In re Saint Vincent’s illustrates that the active
participation of state regulatory agencies can result in the
successful wind down of a hospital, while obtaining a satisfactory
recovery for creditors.153 In re Saint Michael’s demonstrates that
when regulators are not involved in insolvency, such lack of
149. Id.
150. Order, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., 2011-0781 (May 9,
2013).
151. Phillips & Morris, supra note 110, at 8.
152. This conflict has been subject to scholarly review in several other
areas. The area that has received the most attention has been the
intersection of a state’s environmental regulatory power over an entity while
that entity is in bankruptcy or receivership. See Sward, supra note 6, at 404.
153. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 10-11963
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010).
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involvement may have detrimental affects on the overall transfer
of assets or recovery for the hospital’s creditors.154 This section
will also review Kinney and give a judicial perspective on how
regulator involvement can affect receivership proceedings.
A. In re Saint Vincent’s
Saint Vincent’s Catholic Medical Centers of New York (St.
Vincent’s Network), and certain of its affiliates, was an acute-care
hospital network in New York City that provided healthcare
services to “all who [came] to [them] in need, especially the
poor.”155 St. Vincent’s Network operated numerous businesses,
including a behavioral health facility, nursing homes, continuing
care facilities, a hospice, and a home health agency; however, its
core business centered around the operation of its hospital, St.
Vincent’s Hospital Manhattan (St. Vincent’s Hospital), which was
located in the Greenwich Village section of Manhattan.156 St.
Vincent’s Hospital was a 727-bed facility that offered medical
services for acute-care, including behavioral health, cancer,
cardiology, HIV treatment, orthopedic surgery, obstetric and
maternity services, pediatrics, intensive care units, rehabilitation,
and child psychiatry.157
In 2000, St. Vincent’s Network merged with several other
hospitals and healthcare facilities; however, after the merger, St.
Vincent’s Network faced financial difficulties and filed a Chapter
11 bankruptcy petition in 2005.158 After a two-year long Chapter
11 proceeding, in 2007, St. Vincent’s Network emerged from
bankruptcy with a consummated plan of reorganization that
154. In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., et al., 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J.
Aug. 10, 2015).
155. Motion of the Debtors for Entry of Interim and Final Orders
Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363, and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code (A)
Authorizing the Debtors to Continue the Implementation, in Accordance with
New York State Law, of a Plan of Closure for the Debtors’ Manhattan
Hospitals and Certain Affiliated Outpatient Clinics and Practices; and (B)
Scheduling a Final Hearing at 3, ¶ 9, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med.
Ctrs. of N.Y., 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Motion to
Close].
156. Declaration of Mark E. Toney Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule
1008-2 and in Support of First Day Motions and Applications at ¶ 5, In re
Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y, 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr.
14, 2010) [hereinafter Toney Affidavit].
157. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 13, 15.
158. Id. at 15–16, ¶ 34.
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restructured its debts, which totaled over $1 billion.159
Subsequent to the bankruptcy, St. Vincent’s Network continued to
face financial difficulty; while revenues remained consistent, in
2008 and 2009, it suffered operating losses of $43 million and $64
million, respectively.160 In 2008 and 2009, St. Vincent’s Hospital
alone had an operating loss of $81 million and $107 million,
respectively.161 As a result, in 2009, St. Vincent’s Network’s
Board of Directors appointed a “Restructuring Committee” that
was tasked with the oversight of the network’s financial
restructuring and to determine and evaluate all of its strategic
alternatives.162 However, at the end of 2009, St. Vincent’s
Network’s liquidity crisis remained.163 From December 2009 to
February 2010 the network’s senior management began
discussions with its major creditors and informed them of St.
Vincent’s Network’s distressed financial condition.164
St.
Vincent’s Network also discussed with its creditors its options to
preserve St. Vincent’s Hospital’s long-term viability, including
selling the network’s non-hospital assets to another healthcare
provider.165 However, in early February 2010, St. Vincent’s
Network’s economic state had deteriorated to the point where it
was unable to make its upcoming payroll.166 To ensure that St.
Vincent’s Network could make its payroll and to prevent a
bankruptcy filing, the NY DOH and two of the network’s current
creditors, General Electric Corporation and T.D. Bank, N.A.,
provided it with a $6 million emergency loan.167
After St. Vincent’s Network’s financial crisis drew the
attention of state agencies, on February 3, 2010, the thengovernor of New York, David Paterson, held a meeting with St.
Vincent’s Network’s management, NY DOH officials, elected
officials, “senior secured lenders, union leaders, and other key
constituents.”168 At this meeting Governor Paterson requested
159. Id. at 15, ¶ 35.
160. Id. at 25, ¶ 62.
161. Id.
162. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 14, ¶ 32.
163. Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 6, ¶ 16.
164. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 27, ¶ 69.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 27, ¶ 70.
167. Id.; see Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 7, ¶ 18.
168. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 27, ¶ 71; Motion to Close, supra
note 155, at 7, ¶ 19.
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that the parties in attendance form a “task force” that would take
the lead on securing emergency financing to allow St. Vincent’s
time to research and assess its options—“outside of bankruptcy—
for an alliance, affiliation, partnership, or new sponsorship with a
financially stronger healthcare group or chain.”169 This task
force, which included representatives from NY DOH, “was closely
engaged in the restructuring process,” and met by telephone and
in person almost on a daily basis.170 Simultaneously, St. Vincent’s
Network, with the assistance of its investment bankers and
brokers—Cain Brothers & Company, LLP, Shattuck Hammond
Partners, and Loeb & Troper, LLP—worked to market and sell the
network’s non-hospital assets to other healthcare facilities.171
As St. Vincent’s Hospital continued to face deficits, and in an
attempt to prevent the costs of an all-out shut down of the
hospital, St. Vincent’s Network began searching for a partner,
sponsor, or any other affiliation for the hospital that would
preserve its operations.172
St. Vincent’s Network discussed
potential business deals with more than ten major hospitals or
healthcare institutions, including Mount Sinai Medical Center,
New York Presbyterian, and New York University-Langone
Medical Center, just to name a few.173 These institutions, after
signing confidentiality agreements, were permitted to view all
information related to St. Vincent’s Network and St. Vincent’s
Hospital.174 During this process, Mount Sinai emerged as the
most interested and qualified candidate, conducting over sixty
hours of document review, making sixty facility visits to St.
Vincent’s Hospital, and attending several meetings with St.
Vincent’s Network’s management.175 Despite all of its due
diligence, Mount Sinai withdrew as a potential purchaser on
March 31, 2010.176
After Mount Sinai withdrew as a potential purchaser of St.
Vincent’s Hospital, it was evident that no other viable entities
were interested or qualified to purchase, partner, or sponsor the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 28, ¶ 72.
Id.
Id. at 15, ¶ 33.
Id. at 29, ¶ 76.
Id. at 30, ¶ 77.
Id.
Id. at 30, ¶ 78.
Id. at 30, ¶ 79.
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hospital as a “going-concern[]” entity.177 As a result, on April 6,
2010, St. Vincent’s Network’s board voted to approve the closure of
St. Vincent’s Hospital for the health and safety of its patients.178
Two days later, the network submitted a closure plan to the NY
DOH for its approval, and began the wind-down of its
operations.179 At this juncture, while NY DOH did not formally
approve the closure plan, NY DOH was actively involved in
“numerous discussions [with the network] . . . regarding the
possibility of a closure.”180
The closure plan required the
following:
(a) the orderly discharge or relocation of all patients to
neighboring hospitals as quickly and safely as
manageable; (ii) the redirection of emergency room
admissions while keeping the Hospital’s emergency room
open as a ‘treat and release or transfer’ urgent care center
through April 15, 2010; (iii) the continued operation of
certain outpatient clinics for a limited period of time to
allow for the possibility of their transfer to new sponsors;
(iv) the transfer and storage of medical records in
compliance with all regulations; (v) the orderly and safe
disposition of the Hospital’s equipment, pharmaceuticals,
and inventory through appropriate channels in full
compliance with regulatory requirements and (vi) the
implementation of a communication program for patients,
families, employees, providers and the community at
large.181
The closure plan further required that all inpatient operations
at St. Vincent’s Hospital cease by April 30, 2010.182 During the
month of April, in carrying out the wind-down of the hospital and
the closure plan, St. Vincent’s Network lacked liquid funds to
continue its closure, and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April
14, 2010. On the same day, St. Vincent’s Network filed a motion
to continue to operate pursuant to §§ 1107 and 1108 of the Code
177. Id. at 31, ¶ 80.
178. Id.
179. Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 10, ¶ 27–28. (“New York State
regulations require that a hospital obtain written approval of the DOH to
close.”) (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 401.3(g)).
180. Id. at 10, ¶ 28.
181. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at 31, ¶ 82.
182. Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 3, ¶ 3.

178 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:147
and the motion to close.183 A hearing was held on the motion to
close on April 15, 2010, and the motion to close was granted on an
interim basis.184
During the bankruptcy and implementation of the closure
plan, NY DOH was actively involved with St. Vincent’s
Network.185 NY DOH, along with other government regulatory
agencies, assisted St. Vincent’s Network in preventing a
“disruption of patient care and [to] ensure a smooth transition of
[St. Vincent’s Hospital’s] patients to new care providers.”186 NY
DOH accomplished this successful and smooth closure by
submitting input on the closure timeline,187 assisting in the
transfer and discharge of hospital patients,188 soliciting
sponsorships for St. Vincent’s Hospital’s HIV Extension Clinics,189
assisting with the transfer of behavioral health patients,190 and
drafting and disseminating communications regarding St.
Vincent’s Hospital’s closure to other agencies and the public.191
During the bankruptcy, it was noted that NY DOH “[has] been
immersed in this case for several months now from the very
beginning and [it has] worked very closely with [St.] Vincent’s
Hospital on [its] closure.”192 Such collaborative effort included
“daily phone calls from top management to staff . . . [and] on-site
monitors who [were] at the hospital to verify the closure that’s
being done.”193
On May 14, 2010, the bankruptcy court granted the final
order of closure, charging NY DOH and St. Vincent’s Network
with the completion of the closure plan.194 After the final order of
183. Id. at 4, ¶ 8.
184. In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 429 B.R. 139, 143
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
185. Id. (Saint Vincent’s Network “worked under the supervision and with
the active participation of the New York State Department of Health to
implement the closure plan.”).
186. Id.
187. Motion to Close, supra note 155, at 11–12, ¶ 33.
188. Id. at 12, ¶ 35.
189. Id. at 12–13, ¶ 36.
190. Id. at 11–12, ¶ 33.
191. Id. at 14–15, ¶ 40.
192. In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 429 B.R. 139, 145
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
193. Id.
194. Final Order Pursuant to Sections 105(A), 363, And 1108 of the
Bankruptcy Code Authorizing the Debtors to Continue the Implementation,
in Accordance with New York State Law, of a Plan of Closure for the Debtors’
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closure was approved, St. Vincent’s Network, with the assistance
of NY DOH, began selling its assets.195 As a result of its financial
condition and the closure of St. Vincent’s Hospital, St. Vincent’s
Network was no longer able to provide hospice care for patients
and began marketing Pax Christi Hospice, Inc. (Pax Christi), one
of its other assets.196 Ultimately, Visiting Nurse Service of New
York Hospice Care (VNS) purchased Pax Christi for $9 million.197
Notably, NY DOH indicated that it would issue VNS an
emergency certificate of need to operate Pax Christi.198 Under
normal circumstances, the review and the grant of a certificate of
need may take many months.199 “However, in recognition of the
critical need for continued operations at [Pax Christi] . . . [St.
Vincent’s Network] received indications from the [NY DOH] that
it would consent to approving VNS as hospice operator on an
expedited basis.”200 Such emergency approval by NY DOH “would
allow VNS to step in and operate the hospice even though the
formal Certificate of Need approval process has not been
completed, contingent upon VNS completing the process after the
closing of the transaction.”201 NY DOH’s expedited approval of
VNS was based upon the “DOH’s belief that VNS [was] an
appropriate operator” of hospice services.202 Because of the
liquidation value of $9 million, and NY DOH’s assurances that
VNS was an adequate provider of hospice services, the bankruptcy
court confirmed the expedited sale of Pax Christi’s assets to

Manhattan Hospital and Certain Affiliated Outpatient Clinics and Practices
at 18, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., et al., No. 10-11963
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2010) [hereinafter Final Order to Close].
195. Emergency Motion of the Debtors for an Order (A) Approving the
Sale of Assets of Pax Christi Hospice, Inc. on an Expedited Basis to Visiting
Nurse Service of New York Hospice Care, Free and Clear of Liens, Claims,
Encumbrances and Other Interests; (B) Approving the Retention of an
Appraiser in Connection with the Sale; (C) Authorizing the Debtors to Enter
Into a Management Consulting Agreement; and (D) Authorizing Payment of
the Investment Bankers’ Transaction Fee, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med.
Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2010) [hereinafter
Motion to Sell Pax Christi].
196. Id. at 8, ¶¶ 14–15, 19.
197. Id. ¶ 29.
198. Id. at 3–4, ¶ 8.
199. Id. at 9, ¶ 22.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 9, ¶ 22.
202. Id. at 16, ¶ 36.
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VNS.203
St. Vincent’s Network also began marketing its behavioral
health assets,204 and entered into an agreement with St. Joseph’s
Medical Center (St. Joseph’s), who agreed to purchase the
behavioral health assets for $18 million.205 Again, NY DOH
assisted with the transaction to make the transfer as seamless as
possible.206
NY DOH, along with other governmental
organizations, “repeatedly indicated their strenuous objection to
any closure of [St. Vincent’s Network’s] various inpatient and
outpatient behavioral health programs.”207 Accordingly, it agreed
to expedite and facilitate the transfer of the network’s behavioral
health programs and services to St. Joseph’s, which NY DOH
prequalified as a competent purchaser.208 Alternatively, if NY
DOH could not get approval from the appropriate counsels, NY
DOH indicated that it would issue St. Joseph’s emergency
approval of its certificate of need and other licenses to ensure
adequate patient care.209
Various other sales of assets constituted the remainder of St.
Vincent’s Network’s Chapter 11 proceeding, but the majority did
not involve regulator involvement. For example, several real

203. Order (A) Approving the Sale of Assets of Pax Christi Hospice, Inc. on
an Expedited Basis to Visiting Nurse Service of New York Hospice Care, Free
and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Other Interests; (B)
Approving the Retention of an Appraiser in Connection with the Sale; (C)
Authorizing the Debtors to Enter into a Management Consulting Agreement;
and (D) Authorizing Payment of the Investment Bankers’ Transaction Fee at
8, ¶ 4, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 10-11963 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010) [hereinafter Final Order to Sell Pax Christi].
204. Debtors’ Motion for (I) An Order (A) Approving the Sale of
Substantially All the Debtors’ Behavioral Health Assets Including the
Operations of St. Vincent’s Hospital Westchester to Saint Joseph’s Medical
Center, and (B) Approving the Assumption and Assignment of Certain
Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; (II) an Order (A) Approving
Bidding Procedures for the Auction of a Real Estate Option, and (B)
Scheduling an Auction and Real Estate Option Sale Hearing; and (III) an
Order Approving the Sale of the Real Estate Option at 11, ¶ 25, In re Saint
Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25,
2010) [hereinafter Motion to Sell Behavioral Health Assets] (“The marketing
process for the Behavioral Health Assets commenced before the filing of these
Chapter 11 Cases had been ongoing.”).
205. Id. at 14, ¶ 33.
206. Id. at 19, ¶ 44.
207. Id. at 20, ¶ 46.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 21, ¶¶ 47, 67.
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estate sales occurred in an attempt to satisfy the network’s
outstanding obligations;210 however, such transactions are not
subject to certificate of need requirements or other forms of
healthcare regulation, and thus are outside the scope of this
Article. After a full liquidation of assets, unsecured creditors
received five to ten cents on the dollar of the $875 million they
were owed.211
In re Saint Vincent’s reveals the importance of involving state
regulators in a healthcare insolvency so that during the
healthcare organization’s liquidation they may assist with the
transfer of assets and coordinate the appropriate licenses or
certificate of needs. While NY DOH was widely criticized by the
public and the media for facilitating the “closure” of a hospital
through its nonfeasance212, quite the opposite is true. NY DOH
was actively involved in St. Vincent’s Network’s financial crisis
even before the bankruptcy, working together with St. Vincent’s
Network to achieve a successful business model.213 Further, NY
210. Samuel Howard, St. Vincent’s Inks $260M Sale to Real Estate
Kingpin, LAW360 (Apr. 8, 2011, 3:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
237690/st-vincent-s-inks-260m-sale-to-real-estate-kingpin. St. Vincent’s sold
the real estate that hosted its hospital to Rudin Management Co. for $260
million. Rudin proceeded to build a 200-unit condominium complex on the
former site of St. Vincent’s, and have sold the condominiums, on average, for
$3,500 per square foot. Daniel Geiger, Condos at Old St. Vincent’s Site Fetch
$3,500 PSF, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Feb. 18, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://www.
crainsnewyork.com/article/20150218/REAL_ESTATE/150219857/sales-at-com
plex-on-old-st-vincents-hospital-site-defy-high-end-condo-glut (describing how
Rudin had just sold one of five townhouses being built for nearly $25 million).
211. Gale Scott, St. Vincent’s Emerges from Bankruptcy, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS.
(July 6, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120706/
health_care/120709941/.
212. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., 429 B.R. 139,
152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that certain plaintiff initiated an action
against DOH in an attempt to prevent St. Vincent’s closure); see also Kevin
Clarke, The Last Days of St. Vincent’s, AMERICA (July 29, 2016), http://
americamagazine.org/issue/742/article/last-days-st-vincents. Many have said
that DOH “nailed the coffin closed” during the closure of St. Vincent’s, while
others attributed it to the “politics in the city of New York.” Id. In fact, a
board member remarked that “I think the easiest way to explain why . . . St.
Vincent’s is closing its doors tomorrow . . . is that the [DOH] said there is no
need for an acute care hospital in Greenwich Village. Id. And while St.
Vincent’s had many problems, they were on their way to being fixed. Id. But
with the Department of Health saying that there’s no need for an acute care
hospital here, the board had no choice but accept a vote to close.” Id.
213. State DOH Response on St. Vincent’s, VILLAGER (July 29, 2016),
http://thevillager.com/villager_388/statedoh.html (reporting that “since the
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DOH, along with other creditors, supplied St. Vincent’s Network
with a $6 million capital infusion to ensure continued
operations.214 NY DOH did not want St. Vincent’s Hospital to
close, but simply could not continue making capital contributions
to keep it financially afloat.215 NY DOH was also a part of the
Governor’s appointed “task force” to help St. Vincent’s Hospital
assess its options for a transfer of ownership, partnership, or
sponsorship with another healthcare entity, and met almost daily
with other members of the task force to assess the hospital’s
restructuring plan.216 When it was evident that such transfer of
ownership, partnership, or sponsorship was not practical, NY
DOH was actively involved in implementing the closure plan
throughout the bankruptcy.217 During the bankruptcy, NY DOH
was proactive in working with potential purchasers or St.
Vincent’s Network’s assets in either issuing emergency licenses
and certificates of need, or reviewing applications for same on an
expedited basis, so that the public need for such services would
not be sacrificed.218
NY DOH’s active involvement advanced the goals of
insolvency and state regulation. On one hand, NY DOH, in
granting emergency certificates of need or other licenses, made a
sale of St. Vincent’s Network’s assets more practical for the
purchasers by expediting the licensing process. By incentivizing
the deal in this way, NY DOH assisted in liquidating St. Vincent’s
Network’s assets and generating capital to return to its creditors.
On the other hand, NY DOH was assuring that the public at large
fall of 2008 the State Health Department had been meeting with the hospital
leadership to help them restructure to become a viable business model”).
214. Toney Affidavit, supra note 157, at 27, ¶ 70; see also Motion to Close,
supra note 155, at 7, ¶ 18.
215. State DOH Response on St. Vincent’s, supra note 213. Diane Mathis,
Deputy Director of the Public Affairs Group of NY DOH, stated that the
hospital needed $300 million to continue operations as a stand-alone facility,
which was an amount “beyond the capability of the State as well as private
investors.” Id. At the time, the state of New York was facing a $9.2 billion
deficit. Id. Mathis also commented that “[t]he State Health Department did
not advocate for, nor in any way support or encourage, the closure of St.
Vincent’s.” Id.
216. Toney Affidavit, supra note 156, at ¶ 72.
217. See id. ¶ 10.
218. See In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctr., 429 B.R. 139, 143
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. (2010); see also Motion to Sell Pax Christi, supra note 195,
at 9, ¶ 22; Motion to Sell Behavioral Health Assets, supra note 204, at 20–21,
¶¶ 46–47, at 32, ¶ 67.
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was protected and ensured that services such as nursing homes
and behavioral health programs remained in place and were
available to the public at large.
There is nothing easy about closing a non-profit hospital with
a charitable mission. However, while the closure of St. Vincent’s
Hospital was a difficult and emotional decision, it was an easy
financial one. NY DOH’s involvement in St. Vincent’s Hospital’s
closure yielded a result that served the public policy while also
maximizing a return for creditors; an aspirational result for every
insolvency proceeding.
B. In re Saint Michael’s219
Founded in 1897 by the Franciscan Sisters of the Poor, Saint
Michael’s Medical Center, Inc. (St. Michael’s) was a 357-bed
hospital that provided tertiary-care to the Newark region of New
Jersey.220 During 2012, St. Michael’s finances became hampered
by disproportionately low Medicaid reimbursement rates,
unsustainable debt levels, long-term and above-market lease
obligations, and a reduction in inpatient daily revenue.221
Accordingly, St. Michael’s “set out to find a solution to sustain the
medical center’s mission and help it flourish both financially and
clinically.”222 While St. Michael’s solicited a number of entities
that expressed interest in purchasing St. Michael’s, Prime
Healthcare Services-Saint Michael’s, LLC (Prime) appeared to be
219. In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10,
2015) https://cases.primeclerk.com/smmc/Home-Index. This case is still
pending in Bankruptcy court as of this writing.
220. Verified Application in Support of the Debtors’ Motion for an Order
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 365 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 6004 and
6006: (1) Approving “Stalking Horse” Asset Purchase Agreement for the Sale
of Substantially all the Debtors’ Assets; (2) Approving Bidding Procedures,
Including Certain Bid Protections, and Form, Manner and Sufficiency of
Notice; (3) Scheduling (a) an Auction Sale and (b) a Hearing to Consider
Approving the Highest and Best Offer; (4) Authorizing the Debtors to Sell
Substantially all their Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims,
Encumbrances, and Interests; (5) Authorizing the Debtors to Assume and
Assign Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (6) Granting
Other Related Relief at 3, ¶ 6, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999
(Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 17-1 [hereinafter Motion to Approve
Stalking Horse Bid].
221. Declaration of David A. Ricci in Support of Debtors’ First Day
Pleading at 10-11, ¶ 25, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999
(Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 14 [hereinafter Ricci Affidavit].
222. Motion to Approve Stalking Horse Bid, supra note 220, at 4, ¶ 9.
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the most “viable option to financially stabilize and secure a
vibrant future” for St. Michael’s.223 On February 8, 2013, St.
Michael’s and Prime entered into an asset purchase agreement
and submitted the appropriate applications to the New Jersey
Attorney General (NJ AG) and New Jersey Department of Health
(NJ DOH) for the transfer of ownership for St. Michael’s.224
Roughly a month later, Navigant Consulting Inc.
(Navigant)—on behalf of New Jersey Healthcare Facilities
Financing Authority—issued a report (the Navigant Report),
recommending that the healthcare services in Newark be
consolidated, and opining that Prime could not solve St. Michael’s
economic plights.225
In response, St. Michael’s retained
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz, and Cohn LLP to draft another
report—the Honigman Report.226 The Honigman Report
concluded that adoption of the Navigant Report recommendations
would create an unregulated monopoly of healthcare services in
Newark, which would result in higher costs to patients due to a
decrease of competitiveness in the market.227 After submitting
the appropriate applications, and the publication of the Navigant
and Honigman Reports, St. Michael’s did not receive a decision
from NJ DOH regarding the sale of St. Michael’s to Prime for over
two years.228
During the two-year wait, St. Michael’s financial status

223. Id. at 5, ¶ 10.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 5, ¶ 11.
226. See id. at 5, ¶ 12.
227. Id. (The Honigman Report estimated that if the Navigant Report
recommendations were adopted, the community’s healthcare costs would
increase by $180 million annually.).
228. Id. at 5, ¶ 10. David Ricci, CEO of St. Michael’s stated that “[w]e’ve
done everything the state has asked us to do . . . after two and a half years, it
would appear we’re no further along than when we started.” Kathleen
O’Brien, St. Michael’s Medical Center Files for Bankruptcy Protection,
NJ.COM (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nj.com/healthfit/index.ssf/2015/08/st_
michaels_medical_center_files_for_bankruptcy_pr.html. Ricci explained that
“the hospital answered the state’s sixth round of questions regarding the sale
in June and at this point have answered more than 400 questions, but have
received no indications from the state as to when its application under the
[certificate of need] process would be considered complete.” Andrew
Kitchenman, With Bankruptcy Filing, Saint Michael’s Opens up New Front in
Battle Over Sale, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.njspotlight.com/
stories/15/08/10/with-bankruptcy-filing-saint-michael-s-opens-up-new-frontin-battle-over-sale/.
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continued to deteriorate.229 For a six month period that ended on
June 30, 2015, St. Michael’s produced $101.5 million in revenue
and incurred $113 million in operating expenses, yielding a net
operating loss of $11.5 million in six months.230 Before resorting
to bankruptcy, St. Michael’s and Prime engaged in discussions
with NJ DOH regarding a solution to Prime’s application;
however, those discussions were unsuccessful.231 Due to the
state’s
inaction,
the
Navigant
Report’s
recommended
consolidation, and St. Michael’s dismal financial performance, St.
Michael’s “management and Board of Directors, along with their
advisors, evaluated various restructuring options and determined
that the best way to maximize [St. Michael’s] going concern value
for the benefit of all stakeholders was to commence” a bankruptcy
proceeding to force a sale under § 363 of the Code.232
On August 10, 2015, St. Michael’s filed a voluntary petition
for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 of the Code.233
Contemporaneous with its petition for bankruptcy, St. Michael’s
filed a motion to approve a “stalking horse” bid from Prime for a
purchase of St. Michael’s assets, schedule an auction, and
approving the highest and best offer, among other things.234 NJ
DOH objected to St. Michael’s motion, stating that the motion
presupposes NJ DOH’s approval of a hospital operating license
and certificate of need for Prime.235 Specifically, “before the
229. See Ricci Affidavit, supra note, 221, at 9, ¶¶ 19–21. NJ DOH justified
its lengthy review with the following statement: “The department has taken a
reasonable and deliberative approach as it always does with certificate of
need applications. Having completed multiple rounds of questions, it remains
under review.” O’Brien, supra note, 228.
230. Ricci Affidavit, supra note 221, at 9, ¶ 21.
231. See id. at 12, ¶ 28.
232. Id. at 11, ¶ 27. The bankruptcy was also filed to relieve St. Michael’s
from making a $1.8 million payment that was due to the New Jersey
Healthcare Facilities Financing Authority. Susan K. Livio, N.J. Bankruptcy
Judge Approves $62M St. Michael’s Hospital Sale, NJ.COM (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.nj.com/healthfit/index.ssf/2015/11/nj_bankruptcy_judge_approves
_622m_st_michaels_purc.html.
233. Ricci Affidavit, supra note 221, at 3, ¶ 5.
234. See Motion to Approve Stalking Horse Bid, supra note 220, at 3–4, ¶
15.
235. Limited Objection of the New Jersey Department of Health to
Debtors’ Motion for an Order (1) Approving “Staking Horse” Asset Purchase
Agreement and (2) Approving Form, Manner and Sufficiency of Notice
Bidding Procedures at 2, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999
(Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 81 [hereinafter NJ DOH Objection].
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ownership of a general acute care hospital can be transferred, the
owner of the hospital must apply for and receive a [certificate of
need] from the [NJ DOH] authorizing the transfer.”236
Despite NJ DOH’s objection, the bankruptcy court approved
the “stalking horse” bid, auction, and bidding procedures.237 On
November 5, 2015, St. Michael’s conducted a sale auction at which
sixteen bids were submitted by Prime and Prospect Saint
Michael’s, Inc. (Prospect).238 Both Prime and Prospect presented
their vision of the hospital and their credentials to St. Michael’s
Board of Directors, which determined that Prime was the
successful bidder.239 Prime and St. Michael’s executed a purchase
agreement, in which Prime agreed to pay $62,247,750 (Purchase
Price) for the purchase of St. Michael’s assets.240 Based upon the
successful bidding of Prime, St. Michael’s filed a proposed sale
order with the bankruptcy court, which was subsequently granted
on November 13, 2015.241 However, at the time of the order
granting the sale, NJ DOH had still not made a determination on
Prime’s application for a certificate of need.242 Months after the
236. Id. at 4.
237. See Motion to Approve Stalking Horse Bid, supra note 220, at 2–3, ¶
5.
238. Declaration of Thomas Buck in Support of Debtors’ Motion for Entry
of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to (A) Sell Substantially All of their
Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Interest and (B)
Assume and Assign Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases ¶ 8,
In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015),
ECF No. 369 [hereinafter Buck Affidavit].
239. Id. at 3, ¶ 9.
240. Id. at 4, ¶ 11. The purchase price was subject to certain increases or
decreases based upon Saint Michael’s working capital and cash equivalents
at the time of the sale. Id. The Purchase Price was $500,000 more than
Prospect’s bid and $13 million more than the stalking horse bid. Transcript
for approval of the auction sale before Honorable Vincent J. Papalia United
States Bankruptcy Court Judge at 10, In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc.,
15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 398 [hereinafter Transcript
Before Papalia].
241. See Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(A), 363 and 365 (1)
Authorizing the Debtors to Sell Substantially All of their Assets Free and
Clear of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Interests; (2) Authorizing the
Debtors to Assume and Assign Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired
Leases; and (3) Granting Other Related Relief ¶ 4, In re Saint Michaels Med.
Ctr., Inc. 15-24999 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 383.
242. See N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH, CN# 1304-07-01, CERTIFICATE OF NEED
DEPARTMENT STAFF PROJECT SUMMARY, ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS,
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP (2015) at 9–11, http://web.doh.state.nj.us/apps2/
documents/bc/Staff%20Recommendations%20-%20Saint%20Mike’s%20(Final)
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sale, in early February, 2016, the State Health Planning Board
approved a recommendation243 by NJ DOH staff to approve a
certificate of need for the transfer of ownership from St. Michael’s
to Prime.244 The NJ DOH staff commented that it “believe[d] that
the decision to transfer the ownership of St. Michael’s is in the
best interest of the hospital’s patient base. This transfer, the only
option presented to [NJ DOH], would be the least disruptive to the
area’s health care delivery system of all the possible options, at
this time.”245 A month after the NJ DOH Staff Recommendation,
the commissioner of NJ DOH and the NJ AG finally approved the
transfer of the certificate of need.246 The acting commissioner of
NJ DOH commented that she “agree[d] that the proposed transfer
of ownership, as opposed to closure of St. Michael’s, will preserve
appropriate access to healthcare services for the community,
including the medically indigent and medically underserved
population.”247
In re Saint Michael’s illustrates the simple proposition that if
state regulatory agencies are not involved with a distressed
hospital pre- and post-petition for insolvency, an ultimate
disposition of the hospital’s assets may be delayed by the state’s
bureaucratic processes.248 Without understanding the urgency
and exigency of the need to transfer ownership to Prime, NJ DOH
did not act with the urgency, flexibility, or assistance as seen in In
re Saint Vincent’s. While it is NJ DOH’s prerogative to undertake
a comprehensive and diligent review of a certificate of need
application, if they had been involved on the “front end” of St.

.pdf [hereinafter NJ DOH STAFF REPORT].
243. See id. at 17–18. The NJ DOH decided that although St. Michael’s
had complied with state protocol and guidelines, and despite some
misgivings, the transfer would be best for St. Michael’s and the community.
Id.
244. Sale of Saint Michael’s Medical Center to Prime Healthcare Services
Clears Major Hurdle, SAINT MICHAEL’S MEDICAL CENTER (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.smmcnj.com/News/2016/February/Sale-of-Saint-Michaels-Medi
cal-Center-to-Prime-H.aspx.
245. NJ DOH STAFF REPORT, supra note 242, at 16.
246. See Susan K. Livio, N.J. Approves Sale of Bankrupt Newark Hospital,
NJ.COM (Mar. 9, 2016, 11:14 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/
2016/03/state_approves_sale_of_bankrupt_newark_hospital.html.
247. Id.
248. See generally In re Saint Michaels Med. Ctr., Inc., 15-24999 (Bankr.
D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2015). But see In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of
N.Y., 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010).
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Michael’s financial problems, the transparency of the sale to
Prime would have assisted in expediting NJ DOH’s decision
process.
C.

A View from the Bench: A Judicial Perspective of the Westerly
Hospital Special Master Proceeding249

Westerly Hospital was a 125-bed healthcare facility, located
in Westerly, Rhode Island, that had served Westerly and its
surrounding communities for approximately ninety years.250
Westerly Hospital and its related entities251 employed more than
750 union and non-union individuals; had affiliations with more
than 135 primary and specialty physicians; and provided primary
and tertiary care, including interventional cardiology, obstetrics
and gynecology, wound care, and general surgery.252 However, in
2011, with patient revenue of $87.8 million and uncompensated
care totaling $8.3 million, Westerly Hospital operated at a loss, for
the fifth consecutive year, of more than $5.7 million and could not
pay its bills as they became due.253 After failed attempts to find
an economically beneficial transfer, partnership or sponsorship,
Westerly Hospital’s Board of Directors authorized the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) to enter insolvency proceedings.254 On
December 7, 2011, the CEO filed a Petition for the Appointment of
a Special Master255 (Petition), with the statutory powers of a
receiver, for Westerly Hospital and its related entities256 on the
Business Calendar of the Rhode Island Superior Court. 257
249. See Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011
WL 6296898 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011). Many of the following facts are
garnered from public record, but others are from the observations and
experiences of Judge Brian P. Stern, who presided over the matter.
250. Id. at *1.
251. The related entities at the time of the Petition, were comprised of
both not-for and for-profit entities, including Westerly Hospital Health Care,
Inc., Atlantic Medical Group, Inc., Ocean Myst MSO, LLC, Women’s Health
of Westerly, LLC, and North Stonington Health Center, Inc. Id. at *1.
252. Id. at *2.
253. Id. at *1.
254. Id.
255. The appointment of a Special Master is permitted by Rule 53 of the
Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. See R.I. Super. Ct. R.
Civ. P. 53. Pursuant to subsection (c) of Rule 53, a court may limit or expand
a Special Master’s powers as it deems appropriate. See id.
256. Id.
257. Administrative Order No. 2011-10 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2011), https://
www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourt/DecisionsOrders/AdministrativeOrd

2017] HEALTHCARE BANKRUPTCIES & RECEIVERSHIPS 189
In order to avoid closure, and in an effort to continue to
provide low-cost, high-quality healthcare to its patients, the CEO
requested that the court appoint a fiduciary Special Master, with
the powers of a Receiver, to manage the day-to-day operations and
take charge of Westerly Hospital’s assets.258 In addition, the
Petition requested that the Special Master be authorized to review
and make recommendations to the court, including but not limited
to a sale of Westerly Hospital, a reorganization of Westerly
Hospital’s debts, or a closure.259 After notice and hearing, the
court appointed attorney W. Mark Russo as a Temporary Special
Master and authorized the firms of Ferrucci Russo, P.C. and
Adler, Pollack and Sheehan, P.C. to act as legal counsel to the
Special Master.260
It was clear to the court that from the time of the filing of the
Petition that Westerly Hospital’s insolvency proceeding involved
an array of complicated issues and a wide variety of stakeholders,
including medical providers, patients, insurers, secured and
unsecured creditors, employees, unions, and retirement plans.261
It was also evident to the court that a major and critical
participant in the proceeding would be state departments and
agencies as the continued operation and disposition of the estate
was inextricably tied to state licensing statutes, regulatory
requirements, and the statutes governing the transfer or disposal
of the assets of hospitals.262
The court found that in order for the Special Master to have
the greatest likelihood of success, the Special Master needed to
have formal and informal means of communication with the
state’s agencies and regulators from the earliest point possible in
the insolvency proceeding.263 The court, mindful of the inherent
conflicts between the goals of the insolvency process and the state
statutory and regulatory process, as well as the significant
amendments made by the BAPCPA with respect to healthcare

ers/2011-10.pdf.
258. Kinney, 2011 WL 6296898, at *1.
259. See Petition for the Appointment of a Special Master at ¶ 9(a),
Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011 WL 6296898
(R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011).
260. Kinney, 2011 WL 6296898, at *2–3.
261. See id. at *2, *4–5.
262. See id. at *2, *4.
263. See id. at *4.
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entities, determined that these issues needed to be addressed from
the inception of the proceeding to reduce the possibility that these
conflicts would become an impediment to a successful resolution of
the insolvency proceeding.264 Specifically, a disagreement or a
“turf battle” between the Special Master and regulators over
matters that could be resolved or avoided through early
communication would benefit neither the insolvency estate nor
would it be in the best interest of the state regulators. Only
through open and timely communication between the Special
Master and the state regulators could material issues be identified
so that the hospital could have the ability to find a pathway that
would satisfy the goals of both the estate and the regulators.
The court determined that Westerly Hospital’s distressed
state and its special master proceeding “raise[d] significant public
health, regulatory and public protection issues.”265 The court
found that a formal and informal mechanism for the Special
Master266 to share information and receive feedback from these
regulatory, public health, and public protection agencies was
critical to address these issues and provide for an efficient and
successful outcome.267 Accordingly, the court appointed a
voluntary268 Standing Regulatory and Public Protection
Committee (Committee).269 The Committee was comprised of key
264. See id.
265. Id.
266. Depending upon the type of insolvency proceeding, the sharing of
information may be between the state regulators and agencies and the debtor
in possession, trustee, receiver, assignee, or special master.
267. While any regulated entity within or outside of an insolvency
proceeding will have responsibilities to act in accordance with state statutes
and regulations, as well as compliance and reporting requirements, this
procedure allows the insolvent entity, under court supervision, to share
information and discuss potential options with state regulators within a fluid
insolvency proceeding.
268. The Committee was voluntary. The court stated in an order that
participation in the Committee was in no way intended to affect the rights
and duties of each member, and that participation is advisory only, and
specifically intended not to have any effect on any independent statutory,
licensing, regulatory or public protection authority of these agencies or
officials under federal or state law. This portion of the Order was based upon
input from these agencies and/or officials because it was important that their
voluntary participation not be viewed as consenting to the jurisdiction of the
Court, or being estopped from exercising its authority under statutes or
regulations, based upon their participation.
269. While the Bankruptcy Code does not provide for the Committee for
this purpose, an ad hoc or related group may be formed for this purpose.
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regulators involved in the process, including the Rhode Island
Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Director of the
Rhode Island Department of Health; the Director of the
Department of Administration; the Rhode Island Attorney
General; the Rhode Island Health Insurance Commissioner; and
the Lieutenant Governor of the State of Rhode Island, in her
capacity as the Chairperson of the Healthcare Reform
Commission.270 The court required that the Special Master work
diligently with the Committee when taking actions during the
course of the proceeding that impacted public health, regulatory,
and public protection matters.271
The initial meeting of the Committee was scheduled by the
court shortly after the Petitions initial filing and was intended to
bring these stakeholders up to date on the status of the special
master proceeding.272 Topics discussed by the Special Master at
the initial meeting included operational and financial issues such
as: (1) the status of Westerly Hospital’s licenses and permits; (2)
changes to the Board of Directors and Management; (3)
employment and union issues; (4) communications with the public
regarding the proceeding; (5) the ongoing provision of services by
Westerly Hospital; (6) the maintenance of medical records, patient
confidentiality, and the appointment of a Patient Care
Ombudsman; (7) the hospital’s financial situation; and (8) the
sharing of timely information with the Committee. 273
During the course of the proceeding, there were a number of
specific issues that were addressed by the Committee, including
establishing a Patient Care Ombudsman, developing RFPs,
payments of hospital fees, operation of the hospital prior to
closing, and support in navigating and meeting the requirements
of the Hospital Conversion Act.

270. Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011 WL
6296898, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011).
271. Id.
272. While some regulators were consulted in advance of the Petition,
others were not. It became apparent that these stakeholders should have
been notified and briefed, in detail, prior to the filing.
273. Issues, such as investigations into licenses, including physicians and
Medicaid issues, were addressed with the individual Committee members in
their official regulatory capacity.
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1.

The Patient Care Ombudsman

In order to assure that that quality patient care was provided
and medical issues were addressed during the proceeding, the
court ordered that a Patient Care Ombudsman be appointed and
funded by the estate.274 The Special Master provided information
to the Committee about the type of individual and experience it
sought as it went through the search for the appropriate candidate
and provided the Committee, in advance of seeking approval from
the court, with the experience and scope of work regarding the
candidate selected. After receiving no further input from the
Committee, a petition was filed and approved by the court for the
retention of the Patient Care Ombudsman.275 The Ombudsman
was highly qualified and well respected by the regulators and the
medical community and ultimately provided necessary services at
a reasonable cost to assure that the appropriate level of quality of
care was being maintained during the special master
proceeding. The use of a Patient Care Ombudsman, while not
required under state law, provided an important safeguard during
the insolvency proceeding. By appointing an Ombudsman that
was supported by the Special Master, as well as the regulators, it
allowed all parties to more fully concentrate on important
decisions about the future of the hospital.
2.

The Development of the Request for Proposals

After the Special Master conducted an extensive review, he
suggested that a RFP should be issued to help to determine the
disposition of the hospital and its assets.276 While a Special

274. Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011 WL
629689, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011). “The concept of a Patient Care
Ombudsman is taken from the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Section 333(a)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code requires that ‘[i]f the debtor in a case under Chapter 7,
9 or 11 is a health care business, the court shall order . . . the appointment of
an ombudsman to monitor the quality of patient care and to represent the
interests of the patients of a health care business.’” Kinney, 2011 WL
6296898 at *4 n.2 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1)). “[T]he appointment of an
ombudsman [is] to monitor the quality of patient care and to represent the
interests of the patients of the health-care business.” Id. (citing AM. JUR.
Bankruptcy § 696).
275. Order Petition for Instruction, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare,
Inc., No. 2011-0781 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012).
276. Order Entered, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 20110781 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2012).
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Master may, through a court-approved process, solicit proposals,
any successful bidder of a hospital is required to proceed
independently through the state’s regulatory and licensing
process. To ensure that any bidder successfully navigated through
the regulatory and licensing process, the Special Master requested
input from the Committee about the information that should be
requested in the RFP that would assist in the review of the
proposals. Through this process, the RFP documents were
extensively modified to include information about the bidder’s
ability to meet certain requirements under the regulatory
statutes, which dramatically assisted the Special Master in
making a recommendation to the court regarding the best value to
the estate and its creditors.277 The responses to the RFP also
provided the regulators with specific information about the
bidders, which may not have been available otherwise prior to the
formal application process.
In addition to formulating the questions in the RFP, another
significant challenge was the inclusion of a stalking horse bidder
as part of the RFP process.278 The Special Master concluded that
in order to achieve the highest and best offer a stalking horse
bidder should be allowed, as a part of the solicitation process.279
The purpose of the stalking horse was to set the floor for bidding
and to indicate to prospective bidders that there was at least one
other qualified bidder ready, willing and able to acquire the
hospital.280 The agreement with the stalking horse bidder
included a requirement of a breakup fee, upon approval by the
court, should another bidder be successful.281 The use of a
stalking horse bid was a foreign concept to the Committee, which
had a number of concerns, including: (1) allowing a bidder to be
designated a stalking horse without filing an application or
receiving formal approval from the regulators; (2) that a stalking
277. See Order at 2–4, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No.
2011-0781 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012).
278. Special Master’s Petition for Instructions Regarding the Presentation
and Acceptance of a Stalking Horse Offer at 5–6, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp.
Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2012).
279. Id. at 6.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 5; see also Special Master’s Emergency Petition For
Instructions Authorizing the Special Master to Bring a Stalking Horse Bid
Before the Court for Consideration at 2, Kinney v. Westerly Hosp.
Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 23, 2012).
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horse bid may give an unfair advantage to one bidder over others,
as that bidder would have the ability to negotiate a purchase
agreement and material terms of the transaction; and (3) that a
breakup fee may have to be paid to the stalking horse bidder, even
if they did not ultimately acquire the hospital. However, the
Special Master eased the Committee’s concerns by providing it
with information about the advantages and disadvantages of the
stalking horse process and how these transactions have been
effectuated in other jurisdictions, and because of the working
relationship that had been built between the Special Master and
the Committee, this process was brought before the court by
Petition and approved without objections by the regulators. As a
result of the sharing of information and communication between
the Special Master and the Committee, a more efficient and
effective RFP process took place.
3.

Payment of Hospital Licensing Fees

A significant financial issue that arose during the insolvency
proceeding was the unpaid licensing fees owed to the State, both
pre- and post-filing. Due to Westerly Hospital’s cash flow issues,
the Special Master maintained that the hospital could not satisfy
its outstanding licensing fee payments when they became due,
which totaled almost $4 million each year. The State argued that
that if the licensing fees were not paid in full that it had the power
and authority to revoke or suspend the hospital’s operating
license. Despite the number of legal arguments that both the
Special Master and the State could have raised, through robust
communication, the State and the Special Master were able to
come to an agreement allowing the hospital to pay the licensing
fees over a period of time, including payment of a portion of those
fees by the acquirer after closing. The State, by its involvement in
the Committee, recognized the Special Master’s cash flow issues
and the Special Master recognized the licensing fees and the
relationship to the charitable care payments made to the hospital
during the same periods. A very expensive and uncertain conflict
was avoided through communication between the Committee and
the Special Master, allowing the estate to concentrate on the
operation of the hospital and disposition of its assets.
4.

Operating Agreement Prior to Closing
Prior to closing the sale of the hospital with the successful
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bidder and prior to the obtaining final approvals and licenses
under the hospital conversion act and other statutes, the Special
Master determined that it would be in the estate’s best interest to
enter into an operating agreement, which would allow the
successful bidder to assume the day-to-day management of the
hospital under the authority of the Special Master. This required
an understanding and consent by the regulators that this
arrangement would be permissible.
Although the licensing
process had yet to be finalized, the regulators agreed, after
conversations and communications with the Special Master and
the successful bidder that it was in the best interest of all parties
to permit the operating agreement to go forward. When the
petition to authorize the operating agreement was filed with the
court, it was approved by the court without objection. It is unclear
whether such an operating agreement would have been permitted
or possible without ongoing communication among the Special
Master, the successful bidder, and the regulators throughout the
process.
5.

Support During the Hospital Conversion Act Proceedings

During the Hospital Conversion Act proceedings before the
Department of Health and the Attorney General, there was
information and answers to questions that the estate was in the
best position to provide. With the lines of communication fully
opened, often brief communication about issues that could have
slowed down the process allowed it to proceed forward in a timely
and efficient manner.
The outcome of Westerly Hospital’s Special Master proceeding
was extremely successful. A critical hospital serving Rhode Island
and a portion of Connecticut was sold and the sale received
expedited approval by the Department of Health and the Attorney
General.282 This outcome was the opposite of the distinct
possibility when the petition was filed that the hospital would
close. Under the terms of the purchase, Lawrence and Memorial
Hospital agreed to a total of $69 million in cash and other
commitments, including the assumption of $22 million in debt,
committing $6.5 million in working capital during the first two
years, and investing $30 million in new technology, equipment
282. The certificate of need process was expedited in accordance with R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-15-5(a) (2014).
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and expansion of services over the next five years.
Overall the Committee process worked very well. Members of
the Committee had real-time information about the status of the
insolvency proceeding that related to their areas of regulatory and
statutory responsibility. The Committee process fostered a degree
of trust between the regulators and the Special Master, and when
issues arose, rather than the regulators or the Special Master
jumping to conclusions that there was a lack of candor or an issue
could not be resolved, a discussion would take place. Based on
open and honest communication, numerous issues were resolved
before they became major issues. The creditors and prospective
bidders also had a degree of comfort that the debtor and the
regulators were not working at cross-purposes or that the
insolvent estate would close and be liquidated because of the
failure of communication or coordination. If one change could be
made to the Committee concept it would be to have a structure in
place prior to filing the Petition, when the hospital was in distress,
in an attempt to “hit the ground running” upon the hospital filing
for insolvency. Arguably the formation and use of a Committee, in
this case, resulted in secured creditors that were more comfortable
allowing their collateral to be used during the insolvency process
and provided additional comfort to potential purchasers,
ultimately obtaining a higher value for the assets of the Westerly
Hospital and related entities.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS ON REGULATOR INVOLVEMENT

As seen above, when a hospital faces insolvency, the conflict
between maximizing recovery for creditors and complying with
state regulation can be reconciled;283 however, such reconciliation
can only be accomplished when regulators are “brought to the
table” and are actively involved prior to and during the insolvency
proceeding. If regulators are not considered, consulted, or
involved, the disposition of the hospital’s assets, or its transfer of
ownership, may become a difficult and lengthy process, resulting
in higher costs and less return to the insolvent estate.284 There
are several ways regulators can be involved in the affairs of a
distressed hospital: (1) states can establish an emergency hospital
283. See In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-1159, 1997 WL 176574,
at *10 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 26, 1997).
284. See id.
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and healthcare working groups made up of relevant state
regulatory agencies that identify and consult distressed hospitals
within or entering insolvency; (2) state regulatory agencies can
create ad hoc regulatory and public protection committees during
the insolvency proceeding; and (3) state regulatory agencies can
participate in mediation during bankruptcy proceedings.
A.

Establish an Emergency Hospital and Healthcare Working
Group

Each state should establish a Working Group to address
healthcare institutions that are in distress or that have or may file
for insolvency.285
The Working Group should consist of
representation from each licensing and public protection
organization that regulates the healthcare institutions in the
state. The purpose of formation of a regulatory Working Group is
to facilitate communication and coordinate the sharing of all
material information concerning the distressed hospital between
regulatory agencies.
To be effective, at its inception, the Working Group should
establish operating guidelines and procedures. Such operating
guidelines may be memorialized in a memorandum of
understanding or similar interagency agreement. Several
governing policies and procedures that should be considered
include: (1) the authority and limits of the Working Group,
including maintaining the independence and statutory authority
of each individual regulatory member; (2) the appointment of one
department or agency that will be responsible for the
administrative operations of the Working Group, including
identifying the committee membership and maintaining up to date
contact information for each members representative; (3) the
process for activating the committee; (4) the protocol for the
Working Group Chair to act as a liaison to assure that all
members have the latest, most accurate information; (5) if the
committee is a public body under law, assure that all public
records and public meeting requirements are complied with; (6)

285. Depending on the type of governmental entity, the Working Group
can be formed through methods, including, statute, ordinance, regulation or
Executive Order. Some states have already authorized such working groups.
See Governor Jon S. Corzine, Executive Order No. 39 (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://nj.gov/infobank/circular/eojsc39.htm.
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coordinate reporting, where appropriate, to senior government
policy makers that have an interest in the healthcare institution;
and (7) recognize that many healthcare institutions conduct
business in other states, counties or jurisdictions, and that there
needs to be a procedure for the Working Group to coordinate and
communicate, where possible, with the Working Groups
established in other jurisdictions. Working Group members
should be trained in these operating procedures, in advance, so if
and when a qualifying event arises the Working Group can be
activated and begin its tasks immediately.
As aforementioned, during the normal operation of a
healthcare institution and during an insolvency proceeding the
healthcare institution is required to maintain compliance with
state statutes, regulations, and policies implemented and enforced
by a variety of agencies and departments.286 These different
functions are generally distributed among a number of agencies
and departments that have expertise in various areas.287 A
healthcare institution is required to deal with a variety of
departments, agencies, or commissions on an individual basis
during its normal operations. However, during a period where a
healthcare institution faces insolvency, it is important that
regulatory and statutory compliance are administered in a more
coordinated and holistic manner. This is because, during a period
of distress, there is an increased risk of material change within
the hospital, such as a change of control, increase or decrease in
the lines of services offered, requests for purchase or sale of
286. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
287. For instance, the State’s Department of Health generally handles
licensing and certificate of needs; the Office of the Health Insurance
Commissioner generally handles private insurance contracts; the
Department of Human Services generally handles Medicaid reimbursement;
the Department of Labor generally handles employment and safety issues;
and the Department of the Attorney General generally handles public
protection issues, not-for-profit issues, and transfer of health care license
under hospital conversion acts. See What we License, R.I. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
http://health.ri.gov/licenses/index.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2016); Laws,
Regulations, and Orders, R.I. OFF. OF THE HEALTH INS. COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohic.ri.gov/ohic-regulation.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2016);
Workforce Regulation and Safety, R.I. DEP’T OF LAB. & TRAINING,
http://www.dlt.ri.gov/wrs/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2016); Medicaid Programs, R.I.
DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., http://www.dhs.ri.gov/Programs/index.php (last visited
Sept. 5, 2016); Office of the Health Care Advocate, R.I. DEP’T OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, http://www.riag.ri.gov/CivilDivision/OfficeoftheHealthCareAdvoca
te.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2016).
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capital assets, or the sale or closure of the healthcare facility, all of
which involve different regulatory agencies. Accordingly, in such
scenarios it is appropriate for the Working Group be activated to
share information, have real time structured interagency
communication, address issues, and coordinate among regulatory
departments to the extent possible. A proactive approach is a
better course of action than the licensing and public protection
authorities being faced with an emergency that has festered,
without communication and coordination.
Without such
involvement, a State and a hospital may be left with a “Hobson’s
choice”: either the healthcare institution closes immediately or it
will require an immediate capital contribution from the state to
remain open or have an orderly wind down of operations.288
When dealing with healthcare entities that impact the public
health, safety, and welfare of citizens, it is critical that all
government entities that have an interest in the healthcare
institution have an avenue to timely receive and process all
material information so that deliberate and informed decisions
can be made.
The concept of an emergency committee or operations center
already exists in most jurisdictions to address certain public
health and safety emergencies. The Emergency Operations
Center, generally under the auspices of the Emergency
Management Agency, have the statutory and/or executive
authority to bring together departments and agencies in a central
location to provide interagency coordination in support of a
regional incident and local response.289
These emergencies
generally include such events as snowstorms, hurricanes, flooding,
power failures, mass casualty incidents, and other public safety
emergencies.290 The Emergency Operations Center brings
together the parties for a particular incident necessary to address
the emergency.291 The parties may include government
288. “Hobson’s Choice” is “the necessity of accepting one of two or more
equally objectionable alternatives.” Hobson’s Choice, MERRIAM WEBSTER
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Hobson’s%
20choice (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (second full definition).
289. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.050(1), (2)(d) (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
290. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.010 (West, Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess.).
291. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.050(2)(d) (West, Westlaw through
2016 Reg. Sess.).
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departments, agencies, law enforcement, utilities and provide a
structured vehicle to receive information, make recommendations,
and for policy makers to coordinate a response.292
This type of communication and coordination that exists in
the Emergency Operation Center may work well in a potential
healthcare insolvency matter. There are a variety of regulatory
and public protection departments, agencies, commissions, and
subgroups therein that have an interest in the regulation,
licensing, and oversight of healthcare institutions. All of these
governmental institutions should be identified for inclusion in the
Working Group. Other governmental departments and agencies
may also be considered for inclusion in the Working Group, such
as a representative from the budget/finance department, taxation
department, and governmental bonding authority.293
B.

Establish an Ad Hoc Regulatory and Public Protection
Committee

In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, parties can be a part
of official committees, which are “designed to foster the
development
of
consensual
Chapter
[11]
plans
of
reorganization.”294 A principal task of an official committee is to
“directly participate in crafting the debtor’s plan” of
reorganization.295 Members of official committees generally owe
fiduciary duties to the remainder of the committee; individual
members may not use their positions to advance their own
interests at the expense of other members.296 These official
committees are granted statutory powers, including the right to
consult with the debtor; the right to retain professionals, paid for
by the debtor; and standing to be heard by the bankruptcy

292. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.0502)(a), (c), (d) (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
293. These non-regulatory, public-protection agencies may not have access
to all non-public confidential information. This can be addressed in the
Committee’s policies and procedures.
294. Henry C. Kevane, Jeffrey T. Kucera & Mathew J. Ochs, No more Ad
Lib: The Nuts & Bolts of Ad Hoc Bankruptcy Committees, BUS. L. TODAY
(Dec. 2014), at 1, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/
2014/12/02_kevane.html; see 11 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 114–244).
295. Kevane, et al., supra note 294, at 1.
296. Id. at 2; see also 11 U.S.C.A § 1103(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
114–244).
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court.297 The official committee members also have a vote on any
plan of reorganization and the committee may take an official
position on proposed actions of the debtor in the bankruptcy
proceeding.298 While participation on such a committee would
seem to be an appropriate way to involve state regulatory
agencies, the Code is clear that a governmental entity is not
permitted to serve as a voting member of an Official Committee in
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.299 In fact, only a “person” may be on an
official committee, and “government unit”300 is specifically
excluded in the Code from the definition of the term “person.”301
However, such exclusion from official committees should not
dissuade regulatory agencies from forming an ad hoc committee.
Rather, when it becomes likely that a healthcare institution may
file or has filed for bankruptcy or state receivership, government
regulatory agencies should consider participating in ad hoc
regulatory and public protection committees within the insolvency
proceeding.
An ad hoc committee refers to “any group of stakeholders who
wish to collaborate in the pursuit of similar claims or interests.”302
Ad hoc committees are fundamentally different from official
committees as they are “free from many of the constraints
governing official committees.”303
“As a result, an ad hoc
committee is able to organize itself in almost any way it sees fit,
and may be as fluid or as organized as their members and
interests require.”304
297. 11 U.S.C.A § 1103(a), (c)(1) (Westlaw).
298. Id. § 1103(c)(3).
299. See id. § 1102(b)(1) (“persons” can be a part of a committee); 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(41) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“The term
‘person’ . . . does not include governmental unit”). However, a government
unit may be on an official committee if it is a creditor. See id.
300. A “government unit” includes the “United States; State;
Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States
trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a
Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or
other foreign or domestic government.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(27) (Westlaw).
301. See 11 U.S.C.A §§ 101(41), 1102(b)(1) (Westlaw). There is a dearth of
legislative history documenting the rationale behind this decision to exclude
governmental entities under Chapter 11 of the Code.
302. Kevane, et al., supra note 294.
303. Id.
304. Id. “While official committees are frequently administered in a
formal, corporate style—adopting bylaws, subcommittees, chairpersons, and

202 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:147
An ad hoc committee is formed through the collective action of
stakeholders.305 The committee may exist prior to or after a
bankruptcy proceeding has been filed, and the members of the
committee, subject to the agreement of the members, may join or
withdraw from the committee at any time.306 Generally, the
members of an ad hoc committee do not owe a fiduciary duty to
the other members and do not automatically have collective
standing or any greater powers than any other individual party in
the bankruptcy case.307 Although the ad hoc committee does not
have automatic statutory standing to be heard by the bankruptcy
court, the committee collectively may achieve standing if they are
a party with a practical stake in the outcome of the proceeding
under § 1109(b) of the Code, which provides that “[a] party in
interest . . . may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue
in a case under this chapter.”308 Due to the informal status of the
ad hoc committee, the debtor is also not required to disclose
information to ad hoc committees.309 The expenses of the ad hoc
committee are not generally reimbursed unless the committee can
demonstrate that its efforts made a “substantial contribution” to
the debtor’s estate and to creditors generally.310 Similarly, the ad
hoc committee may retain professionals to assist it through the
insolvency; however, the recovery of these “professional fees” may
be questionably recoverable according to recent bankruptcy case
law.311
While the Code prohibits government entities from
participating as voting members in the statutory creditors’
committees under Chapter 11 of the Code, one or more
government entities should create ad hoc committees prior to and
during the insolvency proceeding to establish an avenue of
regular meetings—ad hoc committees are typically more informally
managed.” Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. Ad hoc committees are often formed prior to an insolvency filing
in an attempt to reach a resolution that results in a prepackaged bankruptcy
or receivership.
307. Id.
308. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1109(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244); Ad
Hoc Bondholders Group v. Interco Inc., 141 B.R. 422, 424–25 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1992).
309. Kevane et al., supra note 294, at 2.
310. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(3)(D), (b)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
114–244).
311. Kevane et al., supra note 294, at 4.
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collaboration and communication. After the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005312 (BAPCPA),
the participation of government entities is critical to the outcome
of the bankruptcy case.
Whether the bankruptcy court is
ultimately asked to approve a sale, plan of reorganization, a plan
of adjustment or liquidation, the court can only approve these
outcomes under bankruptcy law when there has been compliance
with state law. That makes the government regulator arguably as
important, if not more important, than any other secured or
unsecured creditors. The government entity, in a very real sense,
is the “elephant in the room,” and an ad hoc committee is the
perfect avenue for state regulators to be heard and efficiently
communicate and coordinate during an insolvency proceeding. An
ad hoc committee, similar to the Emergency Healthcare
Coordinating Committee, allows the regulators and government
entities to communicate and coordinate during the pendency of
the insolvency. The ad hoc committee has the ability to set up
policies and procedures to address its own membership,
confidentiality and the independence of individual regulatory and
government agencies. Such informal participation in an ad hoc
committee will allow for collaboration, communication, and
transparency among its members, including members from
outside the jurisdiction, without the risk of compromising a
regulatory agency’s own statutory responsibilities, obligations,
and independence. The Committee may also act as a
clearinghouse for information.313 The ad hoc committee, on a
case-by-case basis, may also determine whether or not it is
prudent to fund the committee and retain professionals to advise
the committee on issues during the insolvency proceeding, rather
than separate departments and agencies retaining their own
professionals and consultants.
Debtors, creditors, and other interested parties have used the
ad hoc committee process effectively for many years in insolvency
312. Pub. L. No. 109–8A, 119 Stat. 23–217. A number of bankruptcy
courts found, prior to the BAPCPA amendments, that state regulation in the
health care area could be avoided in certain circumstances under § 105 of the
Code.
313. One issue that arises in state regulation that is not as prevalent in
federal regulation is the differing requirements for notice under the
Bankruptcy Code. Through a committee, the debtor can be provided with
detailed information about the government entities that require notice.
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proceedings.314 It is appropriate and necessary for government
entities to begin to use this available tool prior to and during an
insolvency proceeding. This is especially important during a time
when the government entity has a large effect on the outcome of
the insolvency proceeding. A government regulatory ad hoc
committee has proven to be efficient and effective in practice.
During Westerly Hospital’s receivership, the court created a
voluntary ad hoc “Regulatory and Public Protection Committee” so
that “the regulatory and public protection agencies have access to
timely information about the Westerly Hospital and Related
Entities.”315 The Regulatory and Public Protection Committee
was integral to the receivership, and worked closely with the
Special Master during Westerly Hospital’s transfer of
ownership.316
C. Consider Participation in Mediation During the Insolvency
In many insolvency proceedings there are obstacles to
reaching an effective and efficient outcome that satisfies both the
government
entities
licensing
and
public
protection
responsibilities and achieves the highest and best return to
creditors. Mediation may be a valuable resource for working
through these obstacles, as it can coordinate the process, timing,
and sharing of information.317 Mediation is “a process in which a
mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between
parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement
regarding their dispute.”318 Mediation allows the parties to retain
control over both the method of dispute resolution as well as the
outcome, which is voluntary. It provides a forum where one party
can attempt to understand another party’s position and attempt to

314. Kevane et al., supra note 294, at 1.
315. Kinney v. Westerly Hosp. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2011-0781, 2011 WL
6296898, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011).
316. See discussion regarding Westerly Hospital supra Part IV.C.
317. See Order Assigning Matter to Mediation, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr.,
Inc., No. 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013), ECF No. 797.
318. Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy
Mediation Can Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody
Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 432 (2009); see also James M.
Peck & Erica J. Richards, Bankruptcy Mediation: Case Studies,
Considerations and Conclusions, INT’L COMP. LEGAL GUIDE TO CORP.
RECOVERY & INSOLVENCY 16 (8th ed. 2014), https://media2.mofo.com/
documents/140701bankruptcymediationcasestudies.pdf.
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craft a solution that is mutually beneficial.
Through
confidentiality and “no-use” agreements, the parties can share
material information in an attempt to reach consensus without
fear that disclosures will be used later in an adversary
proceeding.319 The mediator, who has expertise in the field, can
facilitate a resolution as an “honest broker.” When successful,
mediation in bankruptcy has certain “well-recognized advantages
over traditional litigation, including reduced costs and increased
predictability of outcomes, a reduction in the length of bankruptcy
proceedings, the removal of sensitive or undecided issues from the
court’s discretion, the elimination of the potential for appeal, and
the maintenance of confidentiality.”320
Mediation was first used in bankruptcy courts in 1986, and by
1990 bankruptcy courts began using mediation on an ad hoc
basis.321 “One of the most significant uses of mediation in the
bankruptcy context is the inclusion of the process in Chapter 11
reorganization plans, in order to resolve claims that do not come
within the limited jurisdiction of bankruptcy procedures.”322
Accordingly, mediation continues to be a tool utilized by many
bankruptcy courts today.323
Government entities have participated, to a limited extent, in
the mediation process.324 To be a viable alternative for the
government entity, it is critical that their independent statutory
and regulatory authority be acknowledged and respected. It is
also critical that an appropriate mediator is selected who has
expertise in both state healthcare regulation and public
protection, as well as the insolvency field. Further, it is important
that the mediator can navigate the areas where mediation would
be beneficial and the areas that are not proper for inclusion in
mediation. The initial response of some state regulators and
public protection officials will be to reject the idea of mediation, as
it will somehow limit the ability of the regulator to exercise its full
319. Peck & Richards, supra note 318, at 19. “One workaround that has
been used in a number of cases is the entry of a protective comfort order
entered in advance of, and as a condition to, plan negotiations, providing that
participants will be protected from specified future claims.” Id.
320. Id.
321. Welsh, supra note 318, at 441.
322. Id. at 444.
323. See Peck & Richards, supra note 318, at 16–19.
324. See Order Assigning Matter to Mediation, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr.,
Inc., No. 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013), ECF No. 797.
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statutory or regulatory authority.325 For example, in In re
Interfaith, the Interfaith Hospital strongly believed that NY DOH
“ha[d] to be a participant” in the mediation, but the NY DOH
believed that its participation would compromise its role as a
regulator.326 NY DOH explained “DOH is a regulator and would
have to make decisions under state law if there’s a transfer of the
ownership certificates.
And they can’t be involved” in
preliminarily approving or denying bidders merely based on
qualifications.327 The bankruptcy court explained that NY DOH,
because it was ultimately charged with the approval of the
transfer license and certificates of need, was an important and
critical voice to be heard in mediation; therefore, without NY
DOH’s participation in mediation, the mediation would be
“pointless.”328 NY DOH rebutted that it “can certainly provide
input if the debtor chooses a plan, but as to competing plans, it’s
not something that [it] [could] be involved in.”329 With that
clarification, and with assurances that the mediation would be
confidential and nonbinding, NY DOH agreed to participate in
mediation in a limited role.330
In some instances, the debtor and other creditors may also be
hesitant about participating in a mediation process with the state
regulators and public protection officials. One reason being that
the government entity may not just be a regulatory authority, but,
in some cases, it may also be a significant creditor in the
insolvency proceedings. A debtor may be concerned that even
though the government entity is not permitted to use the “police
power” exception to the automatic stay to recover pre-petition
debts, the government entity will use the issues being discussed in
the mediation as leverage to have its pre-petition claims paid.
Additionally, a debtor may be concerned that in dealing with a
regulatory agency in a healthcare insolvency matter, there often
exist political issues. For instance, does the government entity
want a certain predetermined result for political reasons such as
the closure of the healthcare institution or an increase or decrease
325. See Transcript of Hearing at 160–61, In re Interfaith Med. Ctr., Inc.,
No. 12-48226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013), ECF No. 801.
326. Id. at 161.
327. Id. at 160.
328. Id. at 162.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 164.
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in services? A political preference or opposition to a for-profit
healthcare entity acquiring the healthcare entity? The debtor and
other creditors may see these issues as a reason that the
mediation will not result in progress, and so is not appropriate to
dedicate the time, expense, and the resulting delay in the overall
case that it may cause.
However, with the regulator and debtor’s concerns in mind, it
is important to remember that the purpose of the mediation with a
government entity is the coordination and sharing of information;
it is not a forum for final statutory decision-making. It is merely
an impetus to open the lines of communication between state
regulators and the healthcare debtor. The mediation may very
well assist all parties to plan and reconcile two sometimes
incongruous systems that have different goals, timelines, and
public policy rationales. It is in the public interest for the
government entity to discuss and coordinate, where possible, to
reach a process and outcome that is in the public interest. While
protecting the exercise of the regulators authority under state law
is appropriate, this can still be accomplished while participating
in mediation. In fact, affecting or curtailing the statutory or
regulatory authority of governmental entities should never be the
subject of mediation.
These perspectives from the regulators, debtors, and creditors
are important considerations demonstrate that the use of
mediation may lead to a more effective and efficient outcome. A
well-chosen mediator, with expertise in both areas of the law, will
be able to direct the mediation to areas where all parties can agree
and have a common interest. The mediator may also assist in
putting in place a schedule that accommodates the regulator’s
statutory issues, the debtor’s issues continuing to operate the
institution, and the creditor’s concerns that its collateral will
continue to decline in value while in use. The potential progress
of the mediation process likely outweighs the delay and cost of the
mediation proceeding. As a result, mediation should be seriously
considered in the appropriate situations.
CONCLUSION

Healthcare insolvencies present a unique dilemma in which
the goal of achieving the “highest and best” return for creditors
may be frustrated by a state’s explicit authority to control the
public health.
However, the cases discussed herein are

208 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:147
illustrative that this conflict can be ameliorated when state
regulators are actively involved in the insolvency from the earliest
point. While there are no formal procedures to force regulator
involvement, several more informal means can accomplish the
same goal. First, states can implement a distressed hospital
working group that is comprised of several regulatory authorities
to address hospitals in distress. Such a working group retains a
regulator’s independent authority while also directing its
attention to hospitals facing economic troubles. Second, state
regulators can form ad hoc committees as part of insolvency
proceedings. Because of the informal nature of the ad hoc
committee, a state regulator can control the extent of its
involvement while achieving transparency and garnering material
information throughout the proceeding. Further, so long as the
regulatory committee is a substantial benefit to the bankrupt
estate, it may be entitled to recover its costs as administrative
expenses to the estate. Last, regulators can participate in
mediation.
Mediation is the ideal method of regulator
involvement as long as it brings regulators “to the table” while at
the same time protecting their independence and respecting their
regulatory role. No matter what method is used one principal
proposition remains: regulator involvement in a healthcare
insolvency is paramount.
Without involvement by state
regulators, the sale, transfer, or disposition of a hospital’s assets
to new ownership may be substantially delayed or postponed and
cost the bankrupt estate additional capital and time. Early and
active regulator involvement serves to maximize recovery for
creditors while ensuring public health is not sacrificed, an
undeniably ideal outcome for any healthcare insolvency.

